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CRA WFORD, DAVIS, AND WAY BEYOND
Richard D. Friedman*

INTRODUCTION

Until 1965, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution hardly mattered. 1 It was
not applicable against the states, and therefore had no role whatsoever in the vast majority of prosecutions. Moreover, if a federal court was inclined to exclude evidence of an out-of-court
statement, it made little practical difference whether the court
termed the statement hearsay or held that the evidence did not
comply with the Confrontation Clause.
But the Supreme Court's decision in Pointer v. Texas2 to apply the Clause to the states meant that, potentially at least, the
Clause mattered a great deal. The Court could invoke the
Clause, as it did in Pointer itself, to hold that evidence of a
statement could not be admitted in a state prosecution, notwithstanding that the evidence complied with the state's hearsay
law. 3 And the steady liberalization of hearsay law, which was
advanced by adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975
and by subsequent codifications based on those Rules adopted by
most of the states, increased the potential significance of the
Confrontation Clause; it meant that black-letter hearsay law
*

Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law

School.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...

to be confronted

with the witnesses against him ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
3 See also, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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would pose no obstacle to some statements that the federal
courts might nonetheless determine to violate the confrontation
right.
The impact of the Clause was limited, however, by the fact
that the Supreme Court did not have a good conception of what
the Clause meant. The Clause seemed to require the exclusion of
some hearsay, but treating it as excluding all hearsay would be
intolerable. The Court floundered, eventually articulating in
Ohio v. Roberts4 a rationale that the Clause was meant to exclude only unreliable hearsay, and leaning heavily on the established and expanding body of hearsay exemptions to determine
what was reliable. 5 Consequently, the Clause still had only a
very limited effect. The lower courts usually could find a basis
for admitting a statement, either by fitting it within an exemption or making a case-specific determination of reliability. 6 And,
though the Supreme Court occasionally swooped down and held
the admission of a given statement to be a violation of the
because it was not
Clause, 7 the law was highly unpredictable
8
rooted in any solid underlying theory.
Crawford v. Washington changed the landscape dramatically. In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not constitutionalize the prevailing law of hearsay. 10 Rather, it enunciates a simple and long-standing
procedural rule: A prosecution witness must give testimony in

4

448 U.S. 56 (1980).

Id. at 66 ("Reliability can be inferred without more where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. ").
6 Note the catalogue of cases reviewed in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 63-65 (2004).
7 E.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); Idaho v. Wright, 497
5

U.S. 805 (1990).

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004) ("The framework is
so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even core
confrontation violations."); id. at 68 n. 10 ("the Roberts test is inherently, and
therefore permanently, unpredictable").
9 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
10 Id. at 60-62.
8
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the presence of the accused, subject to cross-examination. 11
Therefore, if an out-of-court statement is testimonial in nature, it
may not be admitted against an accused unless the accused has
had (or forfeited) an opportunity to examine the witness, and
even then it will be accepted only if the witness is unavailable to
testify at trial. 12
Doctrinally, the transformation was remarkably broad and
swift. The upshot is that we are at the threshold of a new era.
This is the first time that the Confrontation Clause really has a
substantial impact in itself; put another way, this is the first time
that the distinction between the commands of the Clause and the
contents of ordinary hearsay law will really be significant. Many
basic questions will have to be rethought, or approached completely from scratch. That is intellectually very exciting. Moreover, because the change is so new and broad, fears that the testimonial approach will prove to be as indeterminate as the
reliability-oriented approach that it replaced are, I believe, misguided. The reliability approach was incoherent and failed to express any principle worth protecting. Therefore, it was, 3 as Justice Scalia said in Crawford, permanently unpredictable.'
Given that the new world of the testimonial approach is a little more than two years old, one cannot expect that by now all
significant questions would have been resolved and that the
lower courts would all apply those resolutions smoothly and
14
consistently. Indeed, in arguing Hammon v. Indiana, I suggested that the Court not try to do too much all at once; rather,
the Court should be attempting to build a framework that will
last for centuries, and it is more important that it be built well

11 Id. at 59.
12

Id. Crawford also holds out the possibility that statements fitting

within the "dying declaration" exception to the hearsay rule might fall outside
the confrontation right. Id. at 56 n.7. In my view, the proper way to handle
dying declarations is through the doctrine of forfeiture rather than by creating
an exception to the right.
13 Id. at 68 n.10.
14 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), decided sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 126
S. Ct. 552 (2006).
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than that it be built quickly.' 5 And in the end, just as in Crawford, the Court decided Hammon and its companion, Davis v.
Washington,16 without offering a comprehensive definition of
what "testimonial" means. Now, though, we have some additional guideposts: The statements at issue in Hammon are testimonial, while the key ones at issue in Davis are deemed not to
be.
In Part I of this Article, I discuss Davis and Hammon and
the fundamental question of how a court should determine
whether a statement is testimonial. I conclude that the Davis
opinion is consistent with what I believe is the best approach,
one that asks what the anticipation would be of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant. Part II analyzes ambiguities
in the operational test created by Davis. I believe that the "ongoing emergency" doctrine stated by Davis was intended to be
quite narrow, but that lower courts are likely to treat it quite
broadly. Part III then discusses whether a statement can be testimonial only if it was made formally. Davis appeared to point
in different directions with respect to this question. I conclude
that on the best view of the case either there is no formality requirement or, if there is such a requirement, it adds nothing to
the requirement that the statement be made in anticipation of
prosecutorial use. In Part IV, I offer a brief draft of an opinion
that the Court might have written, reaching the same results that
it did in Davis and Hammon but yielding less leeway for manipulation by the lower courts. Part V summarizes some of the
other major issues that must be resolved in coming years to
generate a sound and coherent understanding of the
confrontation right. Finally, Part VI presents interrelated
thoughts on pedagogy and law reform. I contend that the
confrontation right should drive the discussion of hearsay in
Evidence courses, and that the transformation of confrontation
doctrine should cause us to consider radically reshaping the
ordinary law of hearsay.
15Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, Hammon v. Indiana, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006) (No. 05-5705), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/
argumentjtranscripts/05-5705.pdf (hereinafter "Hammon Transcript").
16 126 S.Ct. 2266 (2006).
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AND FRAMEWORK QUESTIONS

The holdings of the Supreme Court in Davis and Hammon
are better, I believe, than the results most of the lower courts
had reached, but not as good as they should have been.
In Hammon, the police came to the Hammon house in response to a domestic disturbance call. Though Amy Hammon at
first denied that anything was wrong, she gave them permission
to enter. They saw signs that there had been an altercation, and
Hershel Hammon told them that he and Amy had had an argument, but he denied that it had become physical. One officer
remained with Hershel while the other spoke with Amy in another room. This time, in response to further questioning, she
said that Hershel had hit her. Amy failed to appear at Hershel's
trial on a domestic battery charge, and so the prosecution, over
Hershel's objection, offered the officer's account of what Amy
had told her. Hershel was convicted, the Indiana courts affirmed, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.
If Hammon had lost in the Supreme Court, then we would
have created a system in which a complainant could create evidence for trial simply by making an accusation to a police officer in her living room, at least so long as the accused was not in
the same room and was in the presence of another officer. The
Supreme Court would have endorsed the toleration, demonstrated by most courts in the years before Crawford and by
many even afterwards, of a practice that should be deemed a
core violation of the Confrontation Clause.
That practice, which Bridget McCormack and I have labeled
"dial-in testimony," took advantage of the Court's preCrawford holding that a statement deemed to fit within the jurisdiction's hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations was exempt from the Confrontation Clause.' 7 By invoking some remarkably generous interpretations of the hearsay exception,
courts routinely admitted accusatory statements made to authorities, even if made hours after the incident and even if the ac-

17

See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 357 (1992).
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cuser was present but did not testify. 18 Moreover, many courts,
presumably having gotten so accustomed to the practice, found it
almost unthinkable to do without it and continued to tolerate it
after Crawford.19 But once one understands and accepts in good
faith
the
transformation
wrought
by
Crawford,
Hammon becomes an easy case, and the opinion of the Court reflects that fact.20
Davis was plainly a much tougher case. When the complainant, Michelle McCottry, spoke to a 911 operator, she was still
in distress, the assault having allegedly occurred just moments
before-so recently that she spoke in the present tense. She was
not yet protected
by a police officer, and the accused remained
21
at large.
Nonetheless, I thought that Davis should have won. In arguing our respective cases, Jeff Fisher, who was Davis's counsel,
and I contended for a simple, intuitively appealing proposition
that would have clarified the law greatly if it had been adopted:
that an accusation of crime made to a police officer or other law
enforcement official is testimonial.22
But the Supreme Court declined to take so broad a view.
The Court enunciated a test that, while not comprehensive, it
regarded as adequate to resolve these cases:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances

18

See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony,

150 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (2002).
19 Note, for example, the set of cases in which the Supreme Court, after
deciding Davis and Hammon, granted certiorari, vacated, and remanded for
reconsideration. These are analyzed in a memorandum prepared by the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia and available at
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/search?q=o%27toole.
20 126 S. Ct. at 2278 (Hammon "much easier" than Davis, the statements being "not much different" from those found to be testimonial in
Crawford).
21 Id. at 2279.
22 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct.
2266 (2006) (No. 05-5224), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/
argument transcripts/05-5224.pdf; Hammon Transcript, at 3.
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objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.23
Even under this test, I think Davis should have won. It appears to me that the purpose of the conversation-on the parts
both of McCottry and of the 911 operator-was not to provide
immediate protection to McCottry. In fact, Davis was evidently
leaving the house as the call began, McCottry expressed no fear
that he would return in the immediate future, and the operator
told her that the police were first going to find the accused and
then come talk to the complainant. 24 Had the operator been concerned that the accused was likely to return to the house in the
immediate future, then her statement to McCottry would make
no sense at all; rather than roaming the streets of the city looking for the accused, at least one officer should have been posted
to the house in case he returned there. Clearly, the aim of the
state's agents, and presumably also the desire of the complainant, was that the accused be arrested and that sanctions-at least
for violating the restraining order mentioned in the call by the
complainant, and perhaps also for criminal violations-be imposed on him.
More fundamentally, though, I do not believe that the decisive question in deciding whether a statement is testimonial
should be one of "primary purpose," either of the declarant or
of the state agents. Determining a "primary purpose" is of
course a difficult matter because so often, as Justice Thomas
correctly pointed out in his dissent, the questioner has more than

23
24

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006).
Id. at 2271. In fact, it appears that the officers did go directly to

McCottry, but that was not the anticipation of the parties to the conversation.

Id.
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one important purpose, and they may meld together. 25 Labeling
one purpose after the fact as primary seems to be a rather arbitrary exercise 26-and thus the test invites manipulation to enhance the chance that the evidence will be received.27
Furthermore, why should the purpose of the questioner matter? I have previously stated at length reasons why, in determining whether a statement is testimonial, the witness' perspective
should be the crucial one. 28 And, curiously, it seems the
Davis Court agreed. Dispelling one of the fallacies adopted by
some lower courts in the wake of Crawford, the Court made
very clear that statements made absent interrogationvolunteered statements or ones made in response to open-ended
questions-may be testimonial. 29 Further, the Court stated, "And
25 Id. at 2283 ("In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a

report of a crime, whether pursuant to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from the perspective of the
police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather evidence. ").
26 Id. at 2284-85.
27 Of course, even the test that I think is optimal, based on the reasonable anticipation of a person in the position of the declarant, is potentially
manipulable. See, e.g., State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006). Indeed,
in some circumstances a test based on the primary purpose of the questioner
is more likely to lead to a conclusion that the statement is testimonial, because whatever the understanding of a reasonable person in the declarant's
position, it is not reasonably deniable that the questioner solicited the statement for forensic purposes. See, e.g., State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo.
2006). Nevertheless, I believe that a test based on the primary purpose of the
questioner will be more subject to manipulation, because often the questioner-frequently a police officer or some other repeat witness who is part of
the criminal justice system-will learn to recite a formula that will give a
friendly court cover for concluding that the questioner's primary purpose was
not forensic.
28 See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial, " 71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 255-59 (2005) [hereinafter Grappling].
29 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 n.l (2006) ("The
Framers
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony
or answers to open-ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation."). In Grappling, supra note 28, at 263-66, adapted from a
posting titled "The Interrogation Bugaboo" that I made to The Confrontation
Blog, http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/ (Jan. 20, 2005, 1:12 EST), I have
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of course even when interrogation exists . . . it is in the final
analysis the declarant's statements, not the interrogator's ques30
tions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate."
So how do we reconcile these divergent statements? I am inclined to believe that the Court (or at least a substantial portion
of it) does recognize that the declarant's perspective is the better
one, and that at least the Court has not rejected that perspective.
Consider this thought experiment. Suppose there is a statement
not made in response to interrogation that, under whatever the
applicable test may be, is testimonial; as I have just noted,
Crawford explicitly recognized that there are such statements,
and plainly the test for determining that such statements are testimonial can have nothing to do with interrogation. Now suppose
that the same statement is made in identical circumstances except
that it is in response to an interrogation conducted primarily for
the purpose of resolving an ongoing emergency. So now the
statement is characterized as nontestimonial under Davis. But
why would the purpose of the interrogator preempt whatever the
underlying standard was that led to the statement being characterized as testimonial absent the interrogation? Most likely, I believe, the Court does recognize (or would if forced to confront
the matter) the existence of some broad, underlying standard that
has nothing to do with an interrogator's purpose. Such a view is
easily consistent with a perception that if the statement is taken
in response to an interrogation conducted largely to resolve an
emergency, the probability is very small that the statement
would be characterized as testimonial under that underlying standard.
In this view, Davis is perfectly compatible with a general
test based on the anticipation of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant. The Court might well believe that, if a
statement is made in response to an interrogation and the interrogation was conducted primarily for the purpose of resolving an
emergency, then it is highly unlikely that a reasonable person in

discussed the fallacy that only statements made in response to interrogation can
be testimonial.
30 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.
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the declarant's position would anticipate that the statement would
be used for prosecution; it might be unlikely both because the
circumstances that govern the interrogator also affect the declarant, and because the fact and nature of the interrogation govern
the declarant's understanding of the situation. And the Court
might believe that the interrogator's purpose is more easily determinable in this setting than is the declarant's understanding.
This view is supported by the fact that in Davis the Court
slipped easily into speaking about the call from the viewpoint of
the declarant. According to the Court, "McCottry's call was
plainly a call for help against bona fide physical threat," 3' and
32
"[s]he was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past."
Similarly, in discussing Crawford, the Court spoke of factors
that "strengthened the statements' testimonial aspect-made it
more objectively apparent, that is, that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down the truth about past criminal
events ....,,33
This view also gains strength with a focus on an ambiguity
in the declarant-perspective test that has not received much open
discussion. 34 When we speak of the anticipation of a reasonable
person in the declarant's position, we are referring to a hypothetical person who has all the information about the particular
situation that the declarant does, and no more. Thus, if the declarant is speaking to an undercover police officer, the hypothetical person would not know that her audience is collecting
information for use in prosecution.
But the question then is whether the anticipation of the
reasonable person should be assessed (a) from the vantage point
that the declarant actually occupied, speaking in the heat of the
moment, or (b) as if she considered the probable use of her
statement after the fact, reflecting calmly while sitting in an
armchair. Arguably, the better perspective is from the armchair,
because that would help the Confrontation Clause achieve its
31Id. at
32

2276.
Id. at 2279.

33

Id. at 2278 (emphasis added).

34 But cf. United States v. Brito, 427 F.3d 53, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2005).
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goal of preventing the creation of a system that allows prosecutors to use testimony not given subject to confrontation. The
armchair view is a very tough sell, however. The path of least
resistance is to conclude that the heat-of-the-moment view is the
proper one, because it focuses on the actual circumstances of the
declarant when she made the statement. And, to the extent the
Davis Court focused on the intent or anticipation of the declarant, it seems clearly to have taken the heat-of-the-moment
view.
I believe that even under that view the statements in
Davis should have been deemed testimonial. But the opposite
conclusion is certainly plausible; a caller in McCottry's position
might not, in the heat of the moment, consider the prospect of
prosecutorial use of her statements unless her attention was
called to it. In short, it may well be that the Court's conclusion
that McCottry's statement was not testimonial rested on a perception that a reasonable person in her position would not, in the
heat of the moment, anticipate prosecutorial use. I therefore do
not think we can draw from Davis any inference adverse to general application of the declarant-perspective approach.
II.

OPERATIONAL AMBIGUITIES

A test relying on the terms "primary purpose" and "ongoing
emergency" is extremely ambiguous, and the Davis Court deepened the ambiguity when it applied the test to the cases before
it. I am afraid that this ambiguity will encourage many postDavis courts to approach cases, as they did in the Roberts era
and in the brief Crawford-to-Davis era, by looking for whatever
toehold they can find to admit accusatory statements that were
made absent an opportunity for confrontation.
Some aspects of the Davis opinion should, however, counsel
a conscientious court to treat the "ongoing emergency" doctrine
restrictively. The Court emphasized that "McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening"35 -and if this
is not strictly accurate, the Court's emphasis on the point is all
35

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276 (2006).
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the more significant. Indeed, though the Court gave various indications of when the emergency ended in Davis, it explicitly
said the emergency ended "when Davis drove away from the
premises"; subsequent statements would be testimonial, and redaction would be necessary. 36
Furthermore, the Court explicitly regarded Hammon as a
"much easier" case-suggesting that the statements in
37
Davis were close to the line and those in Hammon were not.
The Court said that when the officer elicited Amy Hammon's
oral accusation of her husband, "he was not seeking to deter38
mine (as in Davis) 'what is happening,' but 'what happened.''
And it was sufficient for the result that "Amy's statements were
neither a cry for help nor the provision of information enabling
officers immediately to end a threatening situation.
Moreover, the Court's treatment of King v. Brasier,40 an
English case from 1779, is highly significant. There, as the
Davis Court indicated, a young girl, "immediately on her com41
ing home" after an assault, told her mother about the incident.
The Supreme Court distinguished Brasier, while appearing to
endorse it. The case would be helpful to Davis if it more closely
resembled the facts of his case, the Court said, "[b]ut by the
time the victim got home, her story was an account of past
events." 4 2 Thus, notwithstanding the immediacy of the reportand also notwithstanding the facts that the declarant was a young
child and that her audience included no law enforcement officers-the statement was testimonial. Significantly, that is just
how the Brasier court referred to the child's accusation, as testimony. 43
36
17

Id. at 2277.
Id. at 2278.

38 id.
'9

Id.

at 2279.
199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).

40 1 Leach
4' Davis v.

Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006) (quoting 1 Leach
199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202). The Davis court describes the girl as a rape victim,
but the report of the case indicates that the crime was attempted rape.
42

Id. at 2277.

43

168 E.R. at 202-03 (holding that because "no testimony whatever can
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The significance of Brasier for present purposes does not
depend on whether the case was known in the United States at
the time the Sixth Amendment was drafted or adopted.44 Brasier made no new law relevant to the inquiry here; rather, its
significance is that it reflects the common understanding of the
time.
The debated question in Brasier was whether, given the declarant's youth, her out-of-court statement could be admitted. A
premise of the debate was that if she had been an adult the statement could not have been used, because to allow it to be used
would be to tolerate admission against the accused of testimony
given out of court.
Thus, Brasier indicates that a common understanding at the
time of the framing of the Sixth Amendment was that an out-ofcourt accusation, even one made very soon after the event, was
testimonial in nature and therefore not admissible. Whatever the
merits of originalism may be, in general or more narrowly as a
method for construing the Confrontation Clause, such a deeply
seated understanding of the confrontation right should be given
considerable weight in determining the Clause's modern meaning.
A conscientious court should therefore be persuaded not to
stretch the idea of "ongoing emergency" very far at all. Yet a
court inclined to do so-and I believe most are-has some material to work with, beyond the notorious looseness in the term
"emergency."
In Davis, the Court held that "even .

the operator's effort

to establish the identity of the assailant" was necessary to resolve the emergency, "so that the dispatched officers might
45
know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.",
This holding is highly significant given how often, as in Davis,
be legally received except upon oath," the child's statement to her mother
and another woman "ought not to have been received").
44 Cf. Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did
They Know It? Fictional Originalismin Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK.

L. REV. 105, 157 n. 163 (2005) (contending that Framers of the Confrontation
Clause could not have known about Brasier).
45 126 S.Ct. at 2276.
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an identification statement is critical to the prosecution, but it
strikes me as dubious. Would the officers, knowing no more
than that they were trying to find someone accused of having
just committed a violent crime of passion, be lax in their precautions? My skepticism is deepened by the fact that there is no indication that the 911 operator searched Davis' record before the
officers found him.
Further, the Court noted that officers at a potential crime
scene "need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible
danger to the potential victim. ",46 Preliminary indications lend
force to the anticipation that courts frequently will seize upon
this language as a license to admit any statement made before
the accused is in custody or at least in the presence of an officer. It is significant that in Hammon itself the Indiana Supreme
Court had held the statement admissible on the ground that it
was necessary to allow the officers to secure and assess the
situation. 47 The United States Supreme Court rejected that conclusion, of course-but there is not much ground for confidence
that in similar circumstances other lower courts would not reach
the same conclusion that the Indiana Supreme Court did.
In short, most of the indications from the Davis opinion are
that the dividing line between testimonial and nontestimonial
should lie much closer to the situation in Davis than to that in
Hammon. Nonetheless, I believe that until the Supreme Court
intervenes once again, most of the lower courts will place that
line much closer to the situation in Hammon.
Ell.

FORMALITY

In Crawford, the Supreme Court pointed to the formality of
the circumstances under which Sylvia Crawford made her statements as a factor supporting the conclusion that the statements

46

Id. at 2279 (quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542

U.S. 177, 186 (2004)).
47 See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457-58 (Ind. 2005).
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were testimonial.48 Some lower courts took this language for
more than it was worth, by treating formality as a prerequisite
for a statement to be considered testimonial. 49 I believe this conclusion is fallacious and even wrong-headed. 5 °
In brief, formalities, including the oath and opportunity for
cross-examination, are required conditions of acceptable testimony. A statement is not rendered non-testimonial by the absence of formalities; rather, if the statement is genuinely testimonial in nature, the lack of formalities makes the statement
unacceptable. A rule that only formal statements will be characterized as testimonial is therefore theoretically backwards.
Moreover, it creates a perverse incentive: those wanting to give
or take testimony without it being subjected to confrontation
could simply do so informally.
Thus, I had hoped that the decisions in Davis and Hammon
would put to rest the notion that to be characterized as testimonial a statement must meet some standard of formality. My
hopes were raised at argument, because not only was it obvious
that Justice Scalia, the author of Crawford, understood the point,
but he articulated it with some force. 5 ' I would have offered
48

541 U.S. at 53 n.4.

This was, for example, the view of the Indiana Court of Appeals in
Hammon. 809 N.E.2d 945, 952 (2004) ("It appears to us that the common
denominator underlying the Supreme Court's discussion of what constitutes a
'testimonial' statement is the official and formal quality of such a statement. ").
50 For a fuller discussion of my view on this subject, see
Grappling, supra note 28, at 266-69, adapted from a Posting of Richard D. Friedman of
"The
Formality
Bugaboo,"
to
The
Confrontation
Blog,
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com.
51 Note the following dialogue between Justice Scalia and Thomas
Fisher, the Indiana Solicitor General, shortly after Justice Scalia had posed a
hypothetical involving an unsolicited accusatory affidavit.
JUSTICE SCALIA: . . . [S]urely the affidavit isn't-isn't
what's magical. I mean, I'm going to change my hypothetical.
The person recites his accusation on a tape recorder and mails
the tape to the court. Now, are you going to say, well, it's not
an affidavit? You'd exclude that as well, wouldn't you?
MR. FISHER: Well, I-I don't know that I would because,
49
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long odds at that point against the result that Justice Scalia
would write an opinion for a majority of the Court that preserved even the possibility of a formality requirement. And yet
that is just what happened.
The Davis opinion appears to be the product of considerable
compromise, and one of the chief pieces of evidence on point is
the superficial ambiguity with which it deals with formality. In
distinguishing Davis from Crawford, the Court relied in part on
the greater formality of the circumstances under which the
statement in Crawford was made. 52 Moreover, in responding to
Justice Thomas, who would have imposed quite a stringent formality test, the Court said in a footnote, "We do not dispute
that
53
utterance."
testimonial
to
essential
indeed
is
formality
Prosecutors would be unwise, however, to celebrate the
adoption of a meaningful formality requirement. The comparison
of Davis and Crawford does not purport to adopt any such reagain, you've got the-you've got the form that Crawford was
concerned about. The affidavit is the classic form.
JUSTICE SCALIA: That would make no sense at all. I
mean, that-that is just the worst sort of formalism. If you do it
in an affidavit, it's-it's bad, but if you put it on a tape, it'sit's good. I-I cannot understand any reason for that.
Hammon Transcript at 34-35.
52 See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2276-77 (2006).
53 Id. at 2278 n.5. One other passage could breed confusion in this context. The Court quoted a paragraph from Crawford that included the statement, "An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not," Id. at 2274 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36, 51 (2004)), and then said, "A limitation so clearly reflected in the
text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark out not merely
its 'core,' but its perimeter." Id. In context, it is clear that the "limitation so
clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision" is to testimonial
statements, not to formal statements made to government officers. The passage addressed the question "whether the Confrontation Clause applies only
to testimonial hearsay." Id. As in Crawford, the Court offered formal statements to govemment officers as the clearest example of testimonial statements, not as the exclusive one; indeed, in the same discussion, the Court
explicitly reserved the question "whether and when statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are 'testimonial."' Id.
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quirement. It merely lists the difference in formality as one of
54
four factors justifying a different result between the two cases.
With respect to the Court's response to Justice Thomas, it is important to note that declining to dispute a proposition is not the
same thing as asserting it. Moreover, in the context in which the
Court responded to Justice Thomas, the discussion was essentially dictum, because it was not necessary for the Court to resolve whether there was a formality requirement; the discussion
came during the Court's analysis of Hammon, from which Justice Thomas dissented on the ground that the statement was not
sufficiently formal, and the Court held that indeed it was.55
The Davis opinion also contains three other passages that
lend great force to the conclusion that either there is no formality requirement or, if there is one, it adds nothing to the requirement that the statement be made in anticipation of prosecutorial use. First, the Court noted that most of the early cases
imposing confrontation requirements "involved testimonial
statements of the most formal sort-sworn testimony in prior judicial proceedings or formal depositions under oath-which invites the argument that56the scope of the Clause is limited to that
very formal category. ,
But the Court immediately rejected that argument: the English cases were not limited to "prior court testimony and formal
depositions," 57 and the Court cited to the passage in Crawford in
which it said, "We find it implausible that a provision which
concededly condemned trial by sworn ex parte affidavit thought

See id. at 2276-77.
The Court said, in support of this conclusion, "It imports sufficient
formality, in our view, that lies to [police] officers are criminal offenses." Id.
at 2278 n.5. Of course, the Court did not mean to suggest that if lies to police officers were not criminal offenses, then statements to them could not be
testimonial. Among other problems, that rule would allow states to eviscerate
the confrontation right. One could, for example, easily imagine a state decriminalizing false accusations of domestic violence made to the police, to
protect alleged victims from the supposed threat of prosecution and (in fact)
to obviate the necessity for them to testify subject to confrontation.
56 Id. at 2275-76.
17 Id. at 2276.
54
55
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trial by unsworn ex parte affidavit perfectly OK." 58 Similarly,
the Davis Court added that it is not "conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a
deposition." 59 Exactly right. This is why I have said that the argument for a formality requirement is wrong-headed.
Second, in comparing Hammon with Crawford, the Court
acknowledged that "the Crawford interrogation was more formal," but asserted that none of the features that made it so "was
essential to the point" that Sylvia Crawford's statements were
testimonial. 60 The Court noted that those features (that the interrogation "followed a Miranda warning, was tape-recorded, and
took place at the station-house") "strengthened the statements'
testimonial aspect-made it more objectively apparent, that is,
that the purpose of the exercise was to nail down the truth about
past criminal events. " 6 1 The Court then said that in Hammon
"[i]t was formal enough that Amy's interrogation was conducted
in a separate room, away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer receiving her replies for use in his 'investigat[ion].
These factors do not fit easily in the "formal"
category-but they clearly demonstrate that the shared understanding of the conversation was that Amy Hammon was creating evidence that would likely be used in prosecution.
Finally, in responding to Justice Thomas, the Court criticized a formality test, noting that his dissent "has not provided
anything that deserves the description 'workable'-unless one
thinks that the distinction between 'formal' and 'informal' statements qualifies. "63 Moreover, the Court pointed out that Justice
Thomas "even qualifies that vague distinction by acknowledging
that the Confrontation Clause 'also reaches the use of technically

58

59
60

541 U.S. at 52 n.3.
Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2275-76 (2006).
Id. at 2278.

61 Id.

62 Id.
63

Id. at 2278 n.5
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informal statements when used to evade the formalized proc,,64
ess' . .
Perhaps the Court believes that a statement that is testimonial
in nature inevitably will be attended by some formal aspect, particularly if the Court's conception of formality is very broad. Or
perhaps all formal means to the Court in this context is that the
circumstances are such as to give notice that the statement will
be used in prosecution. In any event, it seems unlikely that the
Court will interpret formality to mean more than a showing of
such circumstances-which means that formality will turn out
merely to be an odd way of phrasing what, under the optimal
view, should be the critical question in determining whether a
statement is testimonial.
In short, it appears that Davis prescribes no stringent rule
that a statement can be testimonial only if it is formal. If there is
a formality requirement, it is satisfied by demonstrating that it
was objectively apparent to the declarant that the interrogation
was being held for prosecutorial purposes.
IV. THE OPINION THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN

In this Part, I will summarize much of the discussion above
by presenting a synopsis of what I might have produced had I
been a law clerk under instructions to draft an opinion holding
for Hammon but against Davis:
Petitioners ask us to adopt the principle that an
accusation made to a known law enforcement officer
is necessarily testimonial. For the most part, that
principle holds, but we are unwilling to adopt it as an
inflexible rule. Determining whether a statement is
testimonial must take into account the actual circumstances of the declarant when she makes the statement. In Davis, McCottry began speaking just after a
frightening incident had occurred, while she was unprotected and in clear distress, and while her alleged
assailant was not only at large but nearby; thus, in
64

Id. (quoting in part Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
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describing his conduct, she began speaking in the
present tense. We do not believe that, until she acknowledged that he was driving away, the attention of
a reasonable person in her position and in the heat of
that moment would likely be focused on the ultimate
prosecutorial use of her statement. From that moment
on, but not until then, her statements should be
deemed testimonial.
Hammon is a much easier case. By the time Amy
Hammon made her accusation, she was with a police
officer in one room and her husband was with another officer in another room. The fact that the officer who was with her immediately asked for an affidavit simply confirmed what any reasonable person in
her position would have understood already-that
when she told a police officer that her husband had
assaulted her, the statement was likely to be used for
prosecution.
Such an opinion would, I believe, have been less likely than
is the actual Davis opinion to be manipulated by lower courts in
favor of the prosecution. But there is nothing in Davis that prevents the Supreme Court from interpreting the Confrontation
Clause in the way this hypothetical draft does. Before Davis, it
was apparent that a strong message from the Supreme Court was
necessary to demonstrate that the lower courts should not treat
the new doctrine staked out by Crawford as a mere linguistic curio that ultimately poses no insuperable obstacle to the same
types of results that had been commonplace beforehand. The
same remains true after Davis.
V. OTHER ISSUES

The issues discussed thus far in this article will continue to
be tremendously important in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. But there is a wide range of other issues that also will be
very important and controversial and will need to be resolved in
coming years. This Part sets forth a catalogue-which does not
purport to be exhaustive-of some of these issues, together with
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summary thoughts on each. Note that, although the first few of
these bear on the question of what statements are testimonial,
the others raise more procedural concerns.
(1) To what extent should statements by government agents,
including autopsy and laboratory reports, be considered testimonial? It seems clear to me that such statements made in contemplation of prosecution of a particular crime must be considered
testimonial. But courts have not always so held.65
(2) To what extent may statements other than to law enforcement personnel-to other government agents and to private
persons-be characterized as testimonial? Davis, like Crawford,
does not resolve the matter definitively. But a rule that only
statements to law enforcement personnel or only to government
agents could be considered testimonial would be a disaster. It
would allow a witness to use another type of person as an intermediary to relay testimony to court, and avoid the need to take
an oath, face the accused, or submit to cross-examination. This
scenario is not unrealistic; we may be sure that victims' rights
organizations would often seize the opportunity to relieve complainants of the burdens of testifying in court.
(3) To what extent, if any, should the age, maturity, and
mental condition of a declarant be considered in determining
whether she can be a witness for purposes of the Confrontation
Clause and whether particularstatements by her are testimonial?
On the one hand, it may seem odd for the question of whether a
statement is testimonial to be determined as if the declarant had
the understanding of a competent adult when in fact she is a
child or a person of deficient intelligence. On the other hand, if
the standard for determining whether a statement is testimonial
is based, as I believe it should be, on the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant, then consistent
65

See, e.g., State v. Craig, 853 N.E.2d 621 (Oh. 2006), cert. denied,

127 S.Ct. 1374 (2007).

I would also consider as testimonial a certificate validating an instrument
such as a radar gun, because it is made in contemplation of use in prosecutions. That it is made in contemplation of multiple prosecutions does not
seem to me to alter the situation materially. But see Rackoff v. State, 637
S.E.2d 706 (Ga. 2006). This is, however, a closer question.
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application of the standard probably would require disregarding
the particular declarant's deficiencies. With respect to extremely
young children, however, I believe that there is a plausible argument that they may be incapable of being witnesses within the
meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
(4) In what situations can the state be estoppedfrom denying
the testimonial nature of a statement because an interrogatoror
state agent withheld from the declarant information that would
have made apparent the likely prosecutorialuse of the conversation? Assuming, again, that the critical question is the
understanding of a reasonable person in the position of the
declarant, then the state or some other agent attempting to create
evidence for prosecution will sometimes have an incentive to
hide from a declarant the likely prosecutorial use of the
declarant's statements. Suppose the declarant is not suspected of
wrongdoing, and the agent believes that she would make a
conscientious decision not to volunteer testimony against the
accused. Then if the agent hides the prosecutorial intent to
secure a statement that would be testimonial, given knowledge
of that intent, the state probably should be estopped from
denying that the statement is in fact testimonial. But if the
declarant makes the statement in furtherance of a criminal activity, such as a conspiracy, then there should be no estoppel.
(5) To what extent, if any, may the state attempt to constrain
exercises of the confrontation right intended only to impose costs
on the prosecution? This strikes me as a very difficult topic.
There are situations in which (a) a conscientious court would
recognize that a given type of written statement is testimonial,
but (b) the expense of producing the author as a live witness is
considerable, and (c) the accused appears to have no plausible
expectation that confrontation will do him any good. In such a
situation, the accused may nevertheless be tempted to insist on
the right to confrontation, reckoning that if producing the witness is costly to the prosecution but cost-free to the defense then
the prospect of confrontation improves the accused's bargaining
power. Perhaps the state may attempt to restrain such exercises
of the right, but this is far from clear. Moreover, defining what
are acceptable constraints-perhaps some kind of good faith re-
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quirement-and the situations in which they may be imposed are
not easy matters. I am not sure whether opening this Pandora's
box would be worthwhile in the end.66
(6) To what extent, if any, may the state impose on the accused the burden of securing an opportunity for confrontation?
The state should be allowed to argue that the accused waives the
confrontation right if he does not make a timely demand that the
witness be produced. And perhaps, at least if the prosecution
gives notice that it intends to rely on a witness but there is reason to believe that the witness will not be available to testify at
trial, the accused may be held to have waived the confrontation
right if he does not demand an opportunity to depose the witness
before trial. Beyond this, however, the accused should not be
required to create his own opportunity to "be confronted with"
(note the passive phrasing) an adverse witness. In particular, the
confrontation rights of the accused should not be deemed 67satisfied by giving him the opportunity to subpoena the witness.
(7) What standards govern the adequacy of a pretrial opportunity for cross-examination?One effect of Crawford, as courts,
legislatures, and lawyers adjust to it, should be a substantial increase in the number of depositions taken to preserve testimony.
Suppose such a deposition is offered immediately after the incident in question, and by the time of trial the witness is unavailable to testify. In this situation, the accused may well contend
that the early opportunity to examine the witness was inadequate. Such a contention, I believe, should be resolved not by a
per se rule-either that early timing does or does not render the
66

See generally Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59

VAND. L. REV.
67

475 (2006).

This is the issue that was posed by the petition for certiorari in Pinks

v. North Dakota, No. 06-564, unsuccessfully seeking review of State v.
Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1150
(2007). For further comments on the general issue, see Posting of Richard D.
Friedman of "Shifting the Burden," to the Confrontation Blog
http://confrontationright.blogspot. com/2005/03/shifting-burden.html
(Mar.
16, 2005, 3:27 EST),
and "Shifting the Burden,
Take 2,"
http://confrontationright.blogspot. com/2006/08/shifting-burden-take-2. html
(Aug. 2, 2006, 2:15 EST). The latter entry also comments on Campbell.
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opportunity inadequate-but on the facts of the particular case.
That is, the accused should be required to demonstrate with particularity how a later opportunity for confrontation would have
been materially superior.
Another situation in which adequacy is an issue arises when
the accused has a prior opportunity to examine the witness, but
not necessarily the motivation to conduct the examination as if it
were for trial purposes. This occurs, for example, in jurisdictions that allow depositions for discovery; the lower courts are
divided on the question of whether the opportunity to take a discovery deposition suffices for the Confrontation Clause if the
witness is unavailable at trial. 68 If the answer is in the affirmative, then a careful defense attorney will have to seize every opportunity to take a deposition, lest the witness becomes unavailable and a prior testimonial statement becomes admissible with
no further opportunity for confrontation. This could radically increase the expense of criminal proceedings. The prosecution
probably should bear the burden of determining when there is a
sufficiently strong chance that the witness will become unavailable to warrant a prompt confrontational proceeding.
(8) If the accused has been identified as a suspect and not
arrested, or has not been identified, may the prosecution preserve the testimony of a witness? Suppose the prosecution identifies a person as a suspect in a murder but does not yet have
enough evidence to arrest him, and a key witness may later become unavailable. The prosecution ought to be able to preserve
that witness's testimony by giving the suspect notice and taking
the witness's deposition. Now suppose that the authorities have
identified the suspect as the murderer, but that he has managed
to avoid arrest. The state probably ought to be able to appoint
counsel who could examine the witness at a deposition in case
the witness later becomes unavailable. The accused has not had
a chance to be face to face with the witness, but probably the

68,

See, e.g., Corona v. State, 929 So. 2d 588 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)

(adequate); Lopez v. State, 888 So.2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (inadequate). California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970), answers in the affirmative
the corresponding question with respect to preliminary hearings.
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accused should bear that risk in this situation.
The question becomes more difficult if the accused has not
yet been identified. Even in this situation, it may be clear that
whoever the accused is, the testimony of the witness would be
harmful to him and in what way. If so, it is possible to imagine
a solution. For example, suppose a pathologist performs an autopsy on a person who died of a gunshot wound and writes a report concluding that the wound came from close range but was
not self-inflicted. Whoever the eventual defendant may be, this
statement-which I believe is clearly testimonial-will be harmful to him. Now suppose the court appoints provisional counsel
for the eventual (but as yet unidentified) defendant to examine
the pathologist at a deposition. If the accused is later identified
and brought to trial, and the pathologist is then unavailable, then
the deposition should be admitted against the accused unless he
is able to show at that time particular circumstances why the opportunity for cross-examination was inadequate given provisional
counsel's lack of knowledge at the time of the deposition of who
his client was.
(9) To what extent does the Confrontation Clause apply to
the sentencing phase of a capital case, and to what extent is
there a right-basedperhaps in the Due Process Clause-to confront declarants whose statements are testimonial in nature and
are introduced against the accused in criminalproceedings other
than the trial? John Douglass has argued that "the whole of the
69
Sixth Amendment applies to the whole of a capital case."
Thus, the confrontation right would apply not only at the guilt
phase of a capital trial but also at the sentencing phasedetermining both whether the defendant is eligible for the death
penalty and whether that penalty actually ought to be imposed.
Not all courts have been willing to go that far. 70 Beyond arguments applicable only to capital cases-based on the unified nature of capital trials at the time of the Framers-there is another
69 John G. Douglass,

Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at

Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1967, 1967 (2005).

70 E.g., United States v. Fields, 2007 WL 926864 (5th Cir. 2007);

Summers v. State, 148 P.3d 778 (Nev. 2006).
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sort of argument that applies more broadly to other proceedings
in a prosecution. Suppose that at a suppression hearing a witness
for the prosecution gave direct testimony and then the court excused her on the ground that her testimony was too reliable to
require cross-examination. Even if the Confrontation Clause
does not apply to that hearing, it seems likely that denial of an
opportunity for cross-examination would violate the accused's
constitutional rights. And if that is true, then at least arguably
the same principle should apply if the witness gave testimony
before rather than at the hearing.
(10) What standards and procedures should govern forfeiture
of confrontation rights? Among the many important questions on
this topic are the following:
(a) Must the conduct that allegedly rendered the witness
unavailable to testify subject to confrontation have been motivated in significant part by the accused's desire to achieve that
result? At least with respect to serious intentional wrongful conduct by the accused, the answer should be negative. The idea
behind the forfeiture doctrine is that the accused cannot complain about a situation caused by his own wrongdoing. 71 For example, if the witness is unavailable because the accused murdered her, it should not be a defense to a forfeiture argument to
say that the accused did not murder her for the purpose of rendering her unavailable. 72
(b) May the conduct that allegedly rendered the witness
unavailable to testify subject to confrontation have been the same
conduct with which the accused is charged? Yes. There is no
good reason why not. The argument that applying forfeiture doctrine in this context would be question-begging-that is, assuming the matter at issue-is based on a misconception. The judge
determines the question of forfeiture. The jury (if there is one)
determines guilt. Those are separate determinations. If both de-

71 See Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of Chut-

zpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REv.
506,
516-21
(1997),
available
at
http://www.personal.umich.edu/ - rdfrdman/friedman.pdf.
72 E.g., State v. Jensen, 727 N.W.2d 518, 34-35 (Wis. 2007); People v.
Giles, 55 Cal. Rptr.3d 133 (2007).
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pend, at least in part, on the same factual issue, so be it.
(c) May the challenged statement itself be used in demonstratingforfeiture? Yes. Under the principle of Federal Rule of
Evidence 104(a), the judge in determining a preliminary issue of
fact may rely on any evidence not privileged.73 That includes the
statement in issue. Now, of course, the accused contends that
the statement is testimonial in nature (and unless it is, there is
no need to reach the forfeiture issue). Under the principle discussed above, the confrontation right might be held to apply
even at this preliminary hearing. 74 Logically, then, there appears
to be an infinite regress. In the end, though, the court will decide either that the accused has forfeited the right or that he has
not. In the first case, use of the statement both at the preliminary hearing and at trial does not violate the accused's rights
and in the second case, the statement will not be presented at
trial, so there will not be a violation.
(d) What is the standard of persuasion for demonstrating
that the accused forfeited the confrontation right? It may be that
the Supreme Court will require only that the prosecution satisfy
the "preponderance of the evidence" standard in proving the factual predicates for forfeiture-that is, demonstrate that those
predicates are more likely true than not.75 Given the right at
stake, a higher standard, perhaps "clear and convincing evidence," might be more appropriate.
(e) To what extent is the prosecution foreclosed from
claiming forfeiture because it failed to mitigate the problem? In
particular,
(i) If the witness is dead, when is the prosecutionforeclosed from claiming forfeiture if it did not arrangefor a deposition? It may seem grotesque to arrange for a deposition of a dying person, but the authorities have never shown much
compunction about taking a statement from a victim even in the
final moments of life. Certainly if the victim lingers for days
Fed. R. Evid. 104(a).
See supra pp. 124-25.
Cf. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (holding that preponderance
standard is sufficient constitutionally for determining voluntariness of confession).
7'
74
71
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while still communicative, and arguably for a shorter period, the
76
prosecution ought to arrange a deposition.
(ii) If the prosecution is contending that the witness is
intimidated, what procedures must the government pursue to assure that as much of the confrontation right as possible has been
preserved? For example, to what extent must it exert coercion
against the witness, and must it attempt to secure crossexamination without the witness' testimony? These questions can
be excruciatingly difficult. The court probably should not conclude that the witness is unavailable to testify because the accused has intimidated her unless the court has attempted to compel the witness to testify-not simply by serving her with a
subpoena, but by enforcing it, if necessary, with the contempt
sanction. This is not a move that a court can take lightly unless
it is very confident that it can protect the witness. And it is unimaginable in the case of a child witness-though the court
should consider sanctions against anyone who has exerted influence over the child to prevent her from testifying.
The matter is complicated because, even if the witness is
unwilling to testify in the usual manner-in the presence of the
accused and subject to cross-examination, in open court at trialthat does not mean that no aspect of the confrontation right can
be preserved. To the extent that the state has not attempted all
reasonable means of securing the witness' testimony subject to
some form of confrontation, the conclusion that the accused has
caused the lack of confrontation should be deemed erroneous as
a matter of constitutional law. Perhaps at an earlier time the
witness would have been willing to testify at a deposition, and
so arguably the prosecution should be held accountable for failing to offer one then if it had information suggesting that she
might be unwilling to testify later. Also, perhaps the witness
would be willing to testify subject to cross-examination so long
as the accused was not present or in the judge's chambers, and

76

See Posting of Richard D. Friedman, "Forfeiture, the Prosecutorial

Duty to Mitigate, and Rae Carruth," to The Confrontation Blog,
http://confrontationright.blogspot. com/2005/03/forfeiture-prosecutorial-dutyto.html (March 4, 2005, 3:39 EST).
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these possibilities ought to be explored.
If forfeiture doctrine is left unconstrained, it could swallow
much of the confrontation right. I do not believe that the proper
method for constraining forfeiture doctrine lies in artificially
limiting the type of misconduct that can be considered to forfeit
the right, or limiting the type of evidence that can be used to
prove forfeiture. An elevated standard of persuasion might be of
some help, but probably not very much. The key, I believe, is
to require that before the court concludes that the accused has
forfeited the confrontation right, the state (including the prosecution and the court) must take reasonable steps to preserve however much of the confrontation right as is feasible.
VI. PEDAGOGY AND LAW REFORM

This Part will set forth a few interrelated thoughts transcending the application of Crawford and Davis to criminal prosecutions. I will approach these from the point of pedagogy, but my
interest goes beyond the relatively parochial question of how law
professors should teach this material to practical, though longterm, matters of law reform.
First, should the confrontation right be addressed in courses
in Criminal Procedure or in Evidence, or in both? I firmly believe the answer is both. Crawford makes clear that the confrontation right is not a mere rule of evidence but a fundamental
principle of procedure. 77 Therefore, it has significant procedural
consequences long before a case ever comes to trial. For example, Crawford should push criminal justice systems more in the
direction of facilitating depositions for the preservation of testimony.
At the same time, the confrontation right must occupy a significant place in a course on Evidence. Before Crawford, many
Evidence teachers spent a great deal of time on the rule against

7 541 U.S. at 42 ("bedrock procedural guarantee"). See also id. at 61

("[T]he Clause 'is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner ....
').

HeinOnline -- 15 J.L. & Pol'y 581 2007

582

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

hearsay and little or no time on the confrontation right. This approach always struck me as intellectually timid, because to a
very large extent when the rule against hearsay justifiably calls
for exclusion of evidence, the driving force is the confrontation
right. Even so, before Crawford the approach could be justified
on pragmatic grounds by teachers who did not want to look beyond the law as it then stood, for the confrontation right rarely
required exclusion of evidence that standard hearsay doctrine
would permit. After Crawford, however, the confrontation right
clearly has independent force. In my view, this change makes it
utterly irresponsible to teach hearsay law without spending a
great deal of time on the confrontation right, if for no other reason than that the right effectively preempts many of the results
that hearsay law might otherwise seem to prescribe. It would be
absurd, for example, to spend time examining the "excited utterance" exception and all the expansive interpretations that
courts have given it without recognizing that many of those applications are now rendered unconstitutional.
And now, in light of Davis, I will make a stronger statement: It does not make much sense to teach confrontation after
teaching hearsay. Rather, the two should be integrated, with the
confrontation right being emphasized first-just as historically it
was well developed long before modem hearsay law took
shape-and driving the organization of coverage. Again, taking
the hearsay exception for excited utterances as an example, it
clearly would be a mistake to work through its contours and
only at some later time say, "Many of those applications really
do not matter, because they would be unconstitutional."
Evidence teachers are going to have to work out a sound integrated approach over time, but here is what tentatively strikes
me as a sensible approach:
(1) The natural starting point is the basic confrontation principle enunciated by Crawford-that testimonial statements cannot
be used against an accused if he has not had (or forfeited) an
opportunity for confrontation. 78 Thus, after an historical nod to

78

541 U.S. at 62, 68.
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cases like Raleigh,79 Crawford itself is a good place to begin.
(2) Then it makes sense to delve into the question of what
"testimonial" means, and this of course calls for discussion of
Davis. This also would be a good time to discuss the difference
between accomplice confessions, which are testimonial, and conspirator statements, which are not testimonial-in my view because they are not made in anticipation of prosecutorial use.
Other bounds on the doctrine may then be examined.8 °
(3) When does a testimonial statement not pose a confrontation problem because it is offered for some ground other than
the truth of a matter it asserts? Tennessee v. Street81 is a natural
case for discussion here, as are questions such as whether or
when a testimonial statement may be admitted in support83of an
expert opinion 82 or to show the course of an investigation.
(4) Is the confrontation problem really relieved, as the Supreme Court held in California v. Green84 and reaffirmed in
Crawford,85 by the appearance of the witness at trial, even
though the witness does not testify to the substance of the prior
statement? Understanding this problem helps one realize why, as
in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1), rulemakers have hesitated to eliminate the hearsay bar to all prior statements of a
witness who testifies at trial. 86
(5) When should a witness be deemed unavailable? Several
of the Supreme Court's pre-Crawfordcases-including Ohio v.
Roberts87-are still good law on this point, and Federal Rule of
79 Raleigh's Case, 2 How. St. Tr. 1 (1603).
80

8
82
83
84
85
86

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56.
471 U.S. 409 (1985).
See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E.2d 727 (N.Y. 2005).
See, e.g., United States v. Eberhart, 434 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2006).
399 U.S. 149, 157-67 (1970).
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004).
Rule 801(d)(1) exempts from the hearsay rule limited categories of

prior statements of a trial witness-some prior inconsistent statements, some
prior consistent statements, and most prior statements of identification-but
does not create a general exemption for prior statements of a trial witness.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1).
87 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (holding (dubiously) that the witness whose
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Evidence 804(a), which prescribes standards of unavailability for
purposes of the hearsay rule, could be discussed here.
(6) What is an adequate opportunity for cross-examination?
Materials related to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1) may
come in here, 88 as does the interesting question of whether
a dis89
right.
confrontation
the
for
suffices
covery deposition
(7) What constitutes a sufficient ground for forfeiture, and
what procedures must be followed before the right may be
deemed forfeited?
Cases involving dying declarations would fit
90
here.
well
in
This outline demonstrates that a full exploration of issues related to the confrontation right does not depend on prior examination of hearsay law. On the contrary, not only does the confrontation right stand on its own, but discussion of the
confrontation right helps explain some aspects of hearsay doctrine; in some cases the discussion may give the doctrine better
grounding and in others it may help expose its weaknesses.
After this canvass of the confrontation right, it is possible to
work relatively quickly through the most significant issues related to hearsay when the confrontation right is not at issue. Not
only as teachers, but also as scholars and potential law reformers, the question we should constantly be asking in this realm is,
"Is this really necessary?" That is, once we have protected the
confrontation right, as Crawford does, by a separately articulated doctrine that does not depend on hearsay law, do we need
the elaborate structure of hearsay doctrine with its complex defi-

prior testimonial statement was at issue was unavailable under the circumstances).
88 That Rule excepts a statement from the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial, the statement is prior testimony, and "the party
against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination." Fed. R. Evid.
804(d)(1) (emphasis added).
89 Compare Corona v. State, 929 So. 2d 588, 595-96 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006), with Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046, 1053-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
90 E.g., State v. Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kans. 2004).
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nition of hearsay and its remarkably long and intricate set of exemptions? My own feeling is that outside the context in which
the confrontation right properly applies-testimonial statements
offered against criminal defendants-much hearsay ought to be
admitted, and that to the extent exclusion is warranted it ought
to be under a doctrine much more open-textured than the one we
have now.
Probably, a softer form of the confrontation doctrine should
apply to testimonial statements offered against litigants other
than a criminal defendant. Working out the shape of such a doctrine could be a significant challenge for the next generation of
evidence scholarship. Beyond that, the judgment of admissibility
should depend on a case-by-case assessment of factors such as
the probative value of the statement, the probability that crossexamination would be useful, and the relative 91abilities of the
parties to produce the declarant as a live witness.
Indeed, I am hopeful that over the next few decades pressure
will mount to move hearsay law in this direction. I base this
hope on anticipation that, now that hearsay law is no longer
necessary to do the work that the Confrontation Clause should
perform, its silliness and superfluousness will become more apparent. And I believe the development will be advanced greatly
if Evidence teachers organize coverage around the confrontation
right and then ask, "What further hearsay law, if any, do we
need?"

9' Some years ago, in two articles, one bearing a particularly unfortunate
name, I made a preliminary attempt to reconceptualize the hearsay doctrine,
outside the context where the Confrontation Clause applies, according to the
factors suggested in the text. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial
Economic, Game-theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REV. 723
(1992); Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving Hear-

say Issues, 13 CARD. L. REV. 883 (1991). I believe much of the analysis in
those articles remains sound, but I did not then explore the possibility of a
softer form of confrontation doctrine applying to testimonial statements offered against parties other than a criminal defendant.
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CONCLUSION

The pair of cases decided under the name of Davis confirms that
Crawford is for real. That is, Crawford not only requires courts to
adopt a new way of thinking and expressing themselves about the
Confrontation Clause, but it also causes a change of results, even
some results that courts had reached routinely and almost casually
in recent years. The result in Hammon is one of those; before
Crawford, Amy Hammon's statement was easily admissible, and after Crawford the statement is quite plainly inadmissible.
Ideally, the court would have reversed the conviction in Davis
itself on the basis that an accusation made to a law-enforcement officer is testimonial within the meaning of Crawford. The facts of
that case, however, made reversal unappealing. The Court could
have written an opinion holding that the statements at issue were not
testimonial but explicitly examining the matter from the point of
view of a reasonable person in the position of the declarant; an
opinion taking this approach might have relied on the perception
that in the heat of the moment a reasonable person in McCottry's
position would not have anticipated evidentiary use of her statements. The opinion actually written by the Court is consistent with
that approach, however. Similarly, although the Court did not deny
that a statement must be formal to be testimonial, the opinion may
easily be read not to create a formality requirement that has independent significance.
Fresh accusations will continue to create controversial questions under Crawford, but there is a wide variety of other issues,
many of them procedural, that must be resolved before we have a
sturdy, comprehensive doctrine of the Confrontation Clause. The
process will take decades, and it will require repeated intervention
by the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, even as the courts are reconceptualizing the confrontation right, academics should consider possible
transformations in the law of hearsay. Now that the confrontation
right has its own independent footing, hearsay law is not necessary
to protect it. Much of the law of hearsay that does not involve testimonial statements should wither away over the next few decades.
What remains should bear none of the complexity and haphazard
quality that have plagued generations of students and lawyers.
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WHAT HAPPENED-AND WHAT IS
HAPPENING-TO THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE?
Jeffrey L. Fisher*

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's o~inion in Davis v. Washington,' like
in Crawford v. Washington before it, is obviously the product
of compromise. I do not mean to suggest that any Justices
switched or traded votes to reach greater unanimity in the two
cases decided in the Davis opinion. Rather, the opinion contains
multiple and somewhat distinct threads of reasoning that do not
naturally fit together and, therefore, that presumably reflect
different Justices' divergent theoretical points of view. So the
question remains: when exactly do statements made by victims
or other witnesses, in close proximity to potentially criminal
activity, trigger the Confrontation Clause?
This much we know: the Confrontation Clause gives
defendants the right to be confronted with the "witnesses"
against them-in other words-with those persons whose
"testimony" the prosecution offers against defendants. 3 In order
to safeguard this right, the Clause prohibits the prosecution from
* Associate Professor of Law (Teaching),

Stanford Law School. The

historical portions of this paper are drawn to a substantial degree from the
brief I filed for the petitioner in Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266
(2006). In that respect, I thank Lissa Shook for her assistance in researching
and crafting that brief.
1 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
2 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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introducing out-of-court "testimonial" statements unless the
declarants are unavailable and defendants had a prior
opportunity to cross examine them. 4
Statements a person makes in response to police questioning
at the stationhouse are testimonial. 5 In addition, the Court held
in Hammon v. Indiana, one of the two cases resolved in the
Davis opinion, that accusatory statements that a woman made in
response to police officers' initial inquiries upon responding to
the scene of a suspected assault-while the woman was no
longer in immediate danger-were testimonial. 6
By contrast, the Court also held in Davis v. Washington, the
other case resolved in the Davis opinion, that statements a
woman made to a 911 operator describing an ongoing domestic
disturbance and identifying her alleged assailant as he fled were
not testimonial, although the Court advised that "[i]t could
readily be maintained" that statements she made later in the call,
once the alleged assailant drove away from the premises, were
testimonial. 7 The Court in Davis also laid down a generalized
test for cases such as these:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
past events 8 potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.
There is much murkiness in the many components of that
proffered dichotomy. And that murkiness does not dissipate
when one digs into the opinion. The Court employed three
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
Id. at 53.
6 Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278-79.
7 Id. at 2276-77.
8 Id. at 2273-74.
4

5
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dominant strains of reasoning to elucidate and apply its
dichotomy-each of which, at least at first glance, does not seem
entirely consistent with the others. First, the Court distinguished
statements given during an "ongoing emergency" from those
given after such an emergency was over. 9 Second, the Court
distinguished between statements describing "what is happening"
from those describing "what happened."' ° Third, the Court
distinguished between statements that do not operate as "'a
weaker substitute for live testimony' at trial" from those that do
align with their "courtroom analogues"-in other words, the
Court distinguished those statements that do not function like
witness testimony from those that "do precisely what a witness
does on direct examination." 1 '
In the six months following Davis, most courts have relied
primarily, if not exclusively, on the emergency/nonemergency
dichotomy to resolve cases involving fact patterns that fall in
between the two situations that Davis involved.1 2 Some courts
have relied on the past/present dichotomy.1 3 No court has relied
on the "what-a-witness-does" test.
This preference for the emergency idea is understandable.
We have entered a brave new world of confrontation
jurisprudence in which virtually no judges have experience
applying even its basic governing principles. It makes sense that
judges gravitate toward a concept that at least seems to strike a
familiar note with respect to other areas of criminal procedure.
For example, the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
contains an exception for "exigent circumstances, '' 4 and the
Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause allows the
9 Id.; compare Id. at 2276 (stating that declarant in Davis "was facing an
ongoing emergency" at the beginning of the call) with id. at 2277 ("the
emergency appears to have ended" when Davis drove away); id. at 2278
("[tihere was no emergency in progress" when Amy Hammon spoke to
police officers).
10 See id. at 2276-78.
" Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (emphasis added).
12 See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
14 See infra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing this exception).
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government to introduce confessions police obtain without
Miranda warnings when the police interrogated the suspect in
the midst of a public safety emergency. 15 Furthermore, the
unadorned concept of an emergency is flexible enough that many
appellate courts can recite it, comfortable in the knowledge that
as a test, it will not stand in the way of reaching their desired,
pre-Crawford result: upholding the admission of absent victims'
statements alleging potentially criminal behavior, often some
kind of domestic violence.
But this Article contends, however, that the emergency/nonemergency dichotomy is the wrong touchstone for resolving
disputes over statements describing fresh criminal activity. It
does so by drawing on history to make sense of the Davis
opinion. While the aggressive prosecution of domestic violence
cases gives this issue a modem urgency, the problem of whether
to admit statements describing fresh criminal activity is hardly
new. In particular, prosecutors in the nineteenth century
frequently tried to introduce statements by victims who had just
been assaulted, shot or stabbed (but who did not think they were
so seriously wounded as to be giving dying declarations). Courts
resolved disputes over the admissibility of these statements
exclusively by reference to the past/present dichotomy-or as it
was known then, the res gestae doctrine. Under the res gestae
doctrine, statements describing ongoing activity were admissible,
but statements concerning completed events were not.' 6 It is that
doctrine that not only properly carries the right to confrontation
forward to the post-Crawford era, but also that best synthesizes
the various strands of the Davis opinion itself.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I surveys courts'
historical treatment of fresh descriptions of potentially criminal
events, focusing especially on courts' development of the res
gestae doctrine. This part makes clear that the res gestae
doctrine, contrary to some current assumptions, was more than
simply a hearsay principle; rather, it was deeply rooted in
confrontation law and values. Part II demonstrates that the res
15 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
16 See infra notes 32-53 and accompanying text.
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gestae doctrine best synthesizes the various strands of Davis
and, indeed, provides the only coherent and workable rule for
administering the Confrontation Clause in cases falling in
between the two fact patterns described in Davis. Part III offers
some final thoughts on the implications of grounding Davis in its
res gestae rhetoric. Not only should this doctrinal recognition
require some lower courts to scrutinize more rigorously cases
involving fresh accusations, but it also should inform their
analyses of cases involving other types of currently controversial
hearsay statements, such as statements to medical personnel,
private victims' services organizations, and other private and
quasi-private parties.
I. THE RES GESTAE DOCTRINE

Ever since people have inflicted injuries upon other people,
victims and witnesses of such acts have sought to report them to
others as soon as possible-in order (among other reasons) to
seek help, to assign blame, and to set in motion the process of
law enforcement. A survey of courts' historical treatment of
such statements in criminal cases reveals that for decades, if not
centuries, courts drew a sharp line between those statements that
described ongoing events (or were made in immediate reaction
to them), and those that narrated past occurrences. Furthermore,
courts took this approach not just as a matter of hearsay law, but
in order to safeguard the confrontation right.
A. Fresh Reports in the Founding Era
Professional police forces did not exist during the Founding
Era.17 Nevertheless, victims of alleged crimes during that period
had opportunities-and often an obligation-to immediately
17

See, e.g., Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A

Historical View,

25 AM. J. CRIM.

L. 309,

314 (1998)

("Large-scale

professional police forces did not exist prior to the latter half of the
nineteenth century"); Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 (2004)
(noting that "England did not have a professional police force until the 19th
century").
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report felonious acts to local constables or bailiffs. 18 Such an
oral report was commonly called a "hue and cry." 19 These
prompt reports, like reports to authorities in modem times, were
taken very seriously: it was a crime in itself to give "false
information" to a constable. 20 A hue and cry, also like 911 calls
and reports to responding police officers today, typically served
a dual function of assisting in apprehending a potentially
dangerous suspect and triggering a prospective criminal
prosecution. As Sir Matthew Hale explained the situation in
common law England:
1. The party that levies [the hue and cry] ought to
come to the constable of the vill[age], and give him
notice of a felony committed, and give him such
reasonable assurance thereof as the nature of the case
will bear.
2. If he knows the name of him that did it, he must
tell the constable the same.
3. If he knows it not, but can describe him, he must
describe his person, or his habit, or his horse, or
such circumstances that 1 he knows, which may
2
conduce to his discovery.
Constables, in turn, were required to use the information
provided to orchestrate pursuits and arrests of suspects, and

18

See 2 SIR MATTHEW HALE,

HISTORIA

PLACITORUM

CORONAE: A

OF THE CROWN 98-100 (1st Am. ed. 1847)
[hereinafter 2 Hale].
19 Id. I am grateful to Tim O'Toole and others at the Public Defender
Service of the District of Columbia for suggesting this historical parallel.
20 Id. at 101; compare, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.84.040
(false
reports to police unlawful); with State v. Hopkins, 117 P.3d 377, 384 (Wash.
App. 2005) (Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., dissenting) (noting that false report
statutes apply to 911 calls).
21 2 Hale, supra note 18, at 100; see also 2 id. at 100 n.(c) (citing
other
sources in accord); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 294 (1768) ("The party raising [a hue and cry] must acquaint the
constable of the vill[age] with all the circumstances which he knows of the
felony and the person of the felon.").
HISTORY OF

THE

PLEAS
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sometimes to initiate investigations.
There can be little doubt that the substance of hues and cries
would have been persuasive evidence in criminal prosecutionsand sometimes critical evidence when declarants became
unavailable to testify. Yet even though I detailed the hue and cry
practice in my opening brief in Davis,23 none of the parties or
amici to the litigation were able to uncover a single instance of a
court allowing such an out-of-court statement to be introduced
against a criminal defendant.
In the few reported cases in which courts addressed the
subject, English and American courts agreed that such
statements could not be introduced without the declarant also
testifying in court. For instance, in 1779, the King's Bench held
unanimously in King v. Brasier that an alleged victim's
complaint made to her mother "immediately upon coming
home" from an alleged assault was inadmissible because "no
testimony whatever may be legally received except upon oath"
and the victim was "not sworn or produced as a witness on the
trial. ,24 A later English case ruled that a constable "could not be
asked [at trial] what name [an alleged robbery victim]
mentioned" when the victim reported the crime to him. 25
Finally, shortly after the Bill of Rights was adopted, South
Carolina's highest law court explained that:
Charges for criminal offences are most generally
22

2 Hale, supra note 18 at 99-100; 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, at 294;

see also 1 JAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
224 (1883) (recounting case in which a murder victim's butler "fetch[ed]" the
local magistrate "just as he was going to bed" to bring him to the crime
scene).
23 See Brief for Petitioner at 18-19.
24 King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779).
25 Henry Roscoe, A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 23
(3rd Am. ed. 1846) (describing Rex v. Wink, 172 Eng. Rep. 1293 (1834)).
The judge in Wink did allow the constable to testify as to "whether, in
consequence of the prosecutor [that is, the victim, since this was a private
prosecution] mentioning a name to him, he went in search of any person and,
if he did, who it was." Wink, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1293. But it is unclear
whether the victim testified at trial, so as to alleviate any confrontation
concern this testimony would have raised. See id.

HeinOnline -- 15 J.L. & Pol'y 593 2007

594

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

made by the party injured, and under the influence of
the excitement incident to the wrong done, and
however much inclined the witness may be to speak
the truth, and the magistrate to do his duty in taking
the examination, his evidence will receive a coloring
in proportion to the degree of excitement under which
he labors, which the judgement [sic] may detect, but
which it is impossible exactly to describe, and we
know too how necessary a cross examination is to
elicit the whole truth from even a willing witness;
and to admit such evidence without the means of
applying the ordinary tests, would put in jeopardy the
dearest interests of the community. 26
The strong implication of these passages is that neither the
need to apprehend dangerous individuals nor the declarants'
"excitement" as a result of alleged injuries in any way exempted
their statements reporting crimes to persons of authority from
confrontation restrictions. 2'7 The King's Bench perceived such
reports as "testimony," and the South Carolina Court of Appeals
spoke of the need to submit such reports to "the ordinary tests,"
such as "cross examination."
But one can deduce only so much from three reported cases.
This is especially so in light of the scant reporting style of early
English cases and courts' general hostility at the time to
admitting any hearsay evidence whatsoever. 28 It is necessary,

26
27

State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. 607, 1835 WL 1416, at *2 (S.C. App. 1835).
Indeed, it appears that hue and cry reports were not even thought to

be a sufficient basis to impose pretrial restraints on a suspect's liberty. In
order to justify detaining a suspect in prison pending trial, the Marian bail
and committal statutes required accusers to give statements under oath and
subject to magistrates' questioning. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44; Directions
to Justices of the Peace, 84 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1708). When accusers later
became unavailable for trial, prosecutors sometimes tried to introduce these
examinations (though by the time of the Founding era, such examinations
were admissible only if the defendant had been afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine). See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 46-47 (2004).
28 A prominent eighteenth century treatise on evidence proclaimed
the
general principle that "a mere Hearsay is no Evidence." GEOFFREY GILBERT,
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therefore, to look slightly ahead in time in order to fill out this
picture.
B. The Nineteenth Century Ripening of the Res Gestae
Concept
As the nineteenth century progressed, courts relaxed their
attitudes somewhat toward hearsay evidence, to the point where
they allowed several exceptions to the rule. 29 At the same time,
it became increasingly common for prosecutors to seek to
introduce victims' statements describing criminal conduct such
as shootings, when the victims were unavailable to testify at
trial.
Whatever the reason for this uptick in reported cases,30
courts' resolutions of disputes over these fresh statements
provides a window into how the common law right to
confrontation (as incorporated into state law) was thought to
operate in this context at the time. It is safe to assume that
courts would not have applied any hearsay exception to permit
testimonial evidence to be introduced in criminal cases because
they would have thought doing so would contravene the right to
confrontation.
Indeed, some courts explicitly relied on
THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

99 (Garland Pub. 1979) (1754). To the extent that

any hearsay exceptions were truly established prior to the Founding, not a
single criminal procedure or evidence treatise suggested that out-of-court
statements describing criminal conduct were admissible, no matter how
contemporaneously made with the event described. See, e.g., THOMAS
PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8 (1801) (listing hearsay
exceptions and not mentioning anything related to spontaneous declarations).
29 See Wigmore on Evidence § 1420 (collecting several decisions from
the nineteenth century extolling the value of creating exceptions to the
hearsay rule).
30 It may have been, interestingly enough, due in part to the advent of
the handgun industry; Smith & Wesson opened its doors in 1852 and began
mass-marketing handguns shortly thereafter. See Roy G. Jenks, History of
Smith & Wesson (10th ed. 1977); About Smith and Wesson,
http://www.smith-wesson.com (follow "About Us" hyperlink; then follow
"View History" hyperlink).
31See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004) ("There is scant
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confrontation principles in resolving these cases.
In the early nineteenth century, English and American
treatises formally began to divide statements that were, in the
words of one treatise, "part of the res gestae," in which a
statement "is itself a fact," from those that were "mere oral
assertion[s]. ,,32 As another treatise put it: contemporaneous
declarations "respecting the motives or objects he had in view of
doing" the act were admissible, but assertions made "subsequent
to the doing the acts" were not. 33 If a statement merely related
34
or narrated a past occurrence, it fell outside the res gestae.
Rich Friedman and Bridget McCormack have explained how
the res gestae concept interlocks with the common law right to
confrontation-and specifically with the traditional insistence that
witness testimony be given subject to cross examination. 35 But
Professor Friedman's and Professor McCormack's research
covering the nineteenth century concerned almost exclusively
civil cases. As a result, they could only speculate that the right
to confrontation was actually a driving force causing courts to
distinguish between statements that were a part of ongoing
events from those that described purely past events. 36

evidence" that courts at the time of the Founding invoked any hearsay
exceptions "to admit testimonial statements against the accused in a criminal
case."); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (detailing
that the government's failure to use a "highly attractive" practice for years
following the Founding gives "reason to believe" the practice was considered
unconstitutional).
32 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

368 n.25 (J. Chitty ed. 1826). See also 2 JOSEPH GABBETT, A TREATISE ON
CRIMINAL LAW 468 (1843) (finding statement admissible if it was "itself a
part of the transaction" but not if it is offered to prove "a distinct fact").
33 EUSTACHIUS STRICKLAND, A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 397 (1830).
34 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL ISSUES § 266, 691 ("The rule before us, however, does not permit
the introduction under the guise of res gestae of a narrative of past events,
made after events are closed.").
35 Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150
U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1212-17 (2002).
16 See id. at 1216 ("We suspect that, though the
courts generally spoke
in terms of the accuracy of statements, another consideration [namely, the
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A thorough review of criminal cases in the latter part of the
nineteenth century makes it clear that courts rigorously
scrutinized the temporal nature of fresh reports of potentially
criminal conduct with an eye toward safeguarding the right to
confrontation. Courts allowed witnesses at trial to recount
victims' cries for help and identifications of their attackers made
while the declarants were being attacked. 37 But courts did not
allow hearsay statements into evidence when the statements did
nothing more than describe completed events. In one case from
California, 38 for instance, a police officer ran 140 yards to the
scene of a shooting that had just occurred, where the victim told
the officer that the defendant had shot her. The victim died
before trial,39 so the prosecutor put the officer on the stand to
repeat the victim's statement. The California Supreme Court
held that the statement was inadmissible. Invoking Wharton's
Treatise on Criminal Evidence-the leading authority at the
time-the California Supreme Court explained that "narrative[s]
of past events, made after the events are closed" fall outside of
the res gestae and that "[a]t the time the [victim's declaration]
was made, the shooting had been done, and the assailant had
escaped the scene of the shooting. ,40 In other words, "[tihe
declaration was not the fact talking through the party, but the
party's talk about the facts.", 4 1 As such, it could not be used as
substantive evidence against the accused.
Courts treated reports to private parties (which were much
more common) the same way. In one typical case, a man was
shot in his home. A few minutes later, family members and
friends responded to help him. He told them to "[g]o for a
doctor," and then, in response to someone's question, identified
confrontation right's requirement that testimony be given subject to crossexamination] tended to motivate them.").
37 See Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510 (1871).
38 People v. Wong Ark, 30 P. 1115 (1892).
39 It is unclear when the victim died, but the California Supreme Court
expressly held that the victim's statement "was not admissible as a dying
declaration." Id. at 1115.
40
41

id.
Id.

at 1115-16.
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his shooter. The victim subsequently died, and the prosecutor
moved to include the victim's statements at trial. The Indiana
Supreme Court held that the latter statements constituted "no
part of the res gestae, and were not admissible as such,"
explaining:
It can not, with any propriety, be said, that the
statements made by the deceased, after the crime had
been fully completed, that Prince Jones shot him,
served in any degree to illustrate the character of the
main fact, the shooting. They were the simple
statements of the deceased, narrative of what had
already transpired, and important only as indicating
the person by whom the main fact had been
perpetrated.
We attach no special significance to the fact that the
declarations were made, not contemporaneously with,
but a few minutes after, the shooting, further than
that it shows, in connection with the substance of the
statements, that they were purely narrative of what
had already transpired.4 2
A statement, in sum, saying, "Prince Jones, don't shoot me!"
may have been admissible, but telling a third party that "Prince
Jones just shot me" was not.
Numerous other homicide and similar cases during this
period reached analogous results, making clear that it was
irrelevant whether an accusatory statement "was made so soon
after the occurrence as to exclude the presumption that it has
been fabricated" or whether "it was made under such
circumstances as to compel the conviction of its truth. " 43 Nor
did it matter whether a victim's statement was made moments
after an incident "with a view to the apprehension of the
Jones v. State, 71 Ind. 66, 8-9 (as cited by Westlaw) (1880).
43 Mayes v. State, 1 So. 733, 735 (Miss. 1877); see also State v.
Carlton, 48 Vt. 636, 643 (1876) (finding it was irrelevant whether statement
was made "so soon after that the party had not time, probably, to imagine or
concoct a false account").
42
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offender. "44 If a victim's statement identified the perpetrator of a
"completed" criminal act, most courts held that the statement,
"however nearly contemporaneous with the occurrence," fell
outside the res gestae and was strictly inadmissible.45 Thus,
courts excluded not only victims' reports of who had just shot
47
them, 46 but also bystanders' fresh reports of such events;
victims' statements identifying their assailants moments after
being stabbed; 48 a robbery victim's statement identifying the
perpetrator "directly after" an attack; 49 and other assault
victims' statements moments
after receiving their injuries and
50
attackers.
their
identifying
There were some state courts that did not define the res
gestae concept quite as tightly as the majority did. 5 ' In a much

44 People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 92 (1882); see also State v. Davidson,
30 Vt. 377, 384 (1858) (noting that a statement suggesting need to pursue
suspect inadmissible).
45 Davidson, 30 Vt. at 384-85.

46 In addition to the cases just discussed, see State v. Estoup, 39 La.
Ann. 219, 221 (La. 1887) (shooting victim's statement "a few minutes after
receiving the wound").
47 Elder v. Arkansas, 65 S.W. 938, 939 (Ark. 1901) (describing a case
in which a bystander made a statement to the responding police, one hour
after the shooting occurred and the assailant had fled).
48 Mayes, 1 So. at 735-36; see also Ah Lee, 60 Cal. at 89-91; Kraner v.
State, 61 Miss. 158, 161 (1883).
49 Davidson, 30 Vt. at 384-85.

50 State v. Pomeroy, 25 Kan. 349, 350-51 (1881); Parker v. State, 35
N.E. 1105 (Ind. 1894) (finding a statement made by the deceased
inadmissible because it reported a past occurrence, even though the statement
was made to his wife immediately after the attack, as she was running
downstairs to assist him); State v. Hendricks, 73 S.W. 194 (Mo. 1903)
(discussing statement of assault victim upon returning home and describing
assault to his wife fell outside res gestae because it was unconnected to event:
"No one can read that statement and denominate it anything else than a
narrative. It sounds just like the narrative of a difficulty months after it
occurred. ").
51See State v. Murphy, 17 A. 998 (1889) (holding that statements that
were made 30 seconds and 10-15 minutes after the assault were admissible as
within res gestae because "they were uttered after the lapse of so brief an
interval, and in such connection with the principal transaction as to form a
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criticized decision, for instance, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court upheld the admission of a stabbing victim's
statement identifying his assailant after he ran to his neighbor's
apartment upstairs to seek help. 52 Nonetheless, even these courts

legitimate part of it, and to receive credit and support as one of the
circumstances which accompanied and illustrated the main fact which was the
subject of inquiry before the jury"); State v. Robinson, 27 So. 129, 130-31
(La. 1900) (describing statement made thirty seconds after shooting); Kirby
v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. 681 (1883) (describing declarations made probably
within two minutes, after the shot was fired); Territory v. Callaghan, 6 P.
49, 54-55 (Utah 1885) (statement a few seconds after shooting); State v.
Morrison, 68 P. 48, 51 (Kan. 1902) (detailing reports taking place three to
five minutes after stabbing to first responders); Commonwealth v. Werntz, 29
A. 272 (1894) (reporting statement to police surgeon a few minutes after
stabbing).
52 See Commonwealth v. McPike, 3 Cush. 181 (Mass. 1849); accord
Commonwealth v. Hackett, 2 Allen 136 (Mass. 1861) (applying McPike to
another case). McPike was roundly criticized as without legal or logical
foundation. See I FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ISSUES § 262, at 503 & n. 14 (10th ed. 1912) (stating
that McPike "cannot be sustained" and that "[t]he better rule is that when the
transaction is over, no matter how short may have been in the interval, and
the assailant is absent, declarations by the assailed ...are not part of the res
gestae"); Binns v. State, 57 Ind. 46, 51 (1877) (showing same and refusing
to follow McPike); Mayes, 1 So. at 734-35 (same); Ah Lee, 60 Cal. at 88-92
(same). The Texas Court of Appeals also took a very broad view of the res
gestae doctrine. See Irby v. State, 7 S.W. 705, 706 (Tex. App. 1888)
(describing statement given to father 15 to 20 minutes after shooting
admissible); Kenney v. State, 79 S.W. 817, 819 (Tex. Ct. App. 1903)
(describing case in which a child's report to mother several minutes after
rape was admissible). But the high court in Texas never endorsed these
rulings, and no other court ever treated them-grounded, as they were,
exclusively in Texas precedent-as authoritative.
A lone English criminal case also suggested that a statement describing a
recently completed incident might be admissible, see Rex v. Foster, 6 Car. &
P. 325 (1834), but it, too, met with a strong rebuke. See also, 1 Horace
Smith, Roscoe's Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 28 (8th
Am. ed. 1888) (describing that a broad reading of the decision is "difficult to
reconcile with established principles"). In a subsequent English case, a court
made clear that the res gestae rule remained strict. There, a victim, no more
than one or two minutes after having her throat cut, exclaimed to her aunt
(who was just outside the house), "See what Harry has done!" The court
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agreed with the majority of state courts concerning the
governing standard, as encapsulated by Wharton's treatise:
The res gestae may be (therefore) defined as those
circumstances which are the automatic and
undisguised incidents of a particular litigated act, and
which are admissible when illustrative of such act.
These incidents may be separated from the act by a
lapse of time more or less appreciable. They may
consist, as we will see, of sayings and doings of any
one absorbed in the event, whether participant or
bystander. They may comprise things left undone, as
well as things done. In other words, they must stand
in immediate causal relation to the act-a relation not
broken by the interposition of voluntary individual
53
wariness, seeking to manufacture evidence for itself.
While some courts, in short, allowed that a report made
immediately after a criminal event could be considered part of
the res gestae, it was common ground that the report was
admissible only to the extent it was necessarily considered part
of the event, not the product of independent contemplation.
There can be little doubt that the res gestae doctrine, as
reflected in these cases, was shaped by a desire to protect the
right to confrontation. One mid-century treatise explained that
"[t]he principle of th[e] rule" rejecting all "hearsay reports of
transactions given by persons not produced as witnesses is that
such evidence requires credit to be given to a statement made by
a person who is not subject to the ordinary tests enjoined by law
for ascertaining the correctness and completeness of his
ruled the declaration inadmissible. The court explained that "[a]nything
uttered by the [victim] at the time the act was being done would be
admissible, as, for instance, if she had been heard to say something, as
'Don't, Harry!' But here it was something stated by her after it was all over,
whatever it was, and after the act was completed." Regina v. Bedingfield, 14
Cox Crim. Cas. 341, 342-45 (Crown Ct. 1879).
53 1 Wharton's, Criminal Evidence, supra § 259. See Werntz, 29 A. at
597 (citing this passage); Robinson, 27 So. at 132 (following Wharton's
treatise); Kirby, 77 Va. at 687 (same); McPike, 3 Cush. at 181 (statement fell
inside res gestae because it was uttered "immediately after the occurrence").
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testimony"-namely, to "oath" and "cross-examination."54
Thus, in a case holding inadmissible a manslaughter victim's
statement identifying the alleged perpetrator moments after being
shot, the Vermont Supreme Court made explicit what was
implicit in the treatises and in many other opinions of the time:
The wisdom and justice of this rule in the
administration of criminal law must be apparent. The
general rule is, that no evidence can be received
against the prisoner except such as is taken in his
presence . . . . [To] admit the declarations of the
party injured, made in the absence of the party
accused, and without the right of cross examination,
at a period of time so far subsequent to the happening
of the act or transaction about which the declarations
are made that the party might have invented them,
would be depriving the accused of one of the most
important safeguards the law has given him for his
55
protection.
Other courts invoked similar language. 56 Even when a court
3

A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 124,
at 148 (1842) [hereinafter Greenleaf].
55 Carlton, 48 Vt. at 643-44.
56 See Harris v. State, 1 Tex. Ct. App. 74, 80-81 (1876) WL 9028 at *4
("The principle of the rule [excluding evidence outside the res gestae] is that
such evidence requires credit to be given to a statement made by a person
who is not subjected to the ordinary tests enjoined by the law for ascertaining
the correctness and completeness of his testimony-namely, that oral
testimony should be delivered in the presence of the court, or a magistrate,
under the moral and legal sanctions of an oath, and where the moral and
intellectual character, the motives and deportment, of the witness can be
examined, and his capacity and opportunities for observation, and his
memory, can be tested by a cross-examination."); People v. Simonds, 19
Cal. 275, 278 (1861) ("It is true that it has been sometimes said declarations
of a party at the time of doing an act, which is legal evidence, are admissible
as parts of the res gestae, but this rule does not apply to admit, as against
third persons, declarations of a past fact, having the effect of criminating the
latter. If so, any felon caught with stolen property might criminate an
innocent man, by declaring that he obtained the property from such person,
or that such third person was associated with the declarant in the criminal
54

SIMON GREENLEAF,
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with a more expansive view of the res gestae doctrine than most
allowed the admission of an accusatory statement made
immediately after the event at issue, it emphasized that this did
not violate the defendant's right to confrontation because what
the declarant "said and did, in natural consequence of the
principal transaction, become original evidence"-that is,
contemporaneous with the transaction itself. 57 Genuine res
gestae statements, in short, may have been exempt from
confrontation requirements, but courts were loathe to go any
further.
There was only one recognized exception (aside from dying
declarations) to the prohibition against admitting declarations
outside of the res gestae: in cases in which "a person ha[d] been
in any way outraged"-most often in rape cases, but also
apparently in other cases lacking any sexual component-the fact
that this person made a complaint right after the event happened
was admissible. 58 Sometimes courts admitted only the fact that
the alleged victim complained, and occasionally courts permitted
the substance
of such complaints to corroborate the victim's trial
59
testimony.
But this "outcry" exception actually proved the rule that
introducing any declaration accusing someone of committing a
completed criminal act implicated the right to confrontation. For
it was settled that if the victim did not testify, evidence of the
fresh complaint-even to a relative or friend-"was not
admissible, and only the fact that a complaint was made could

fact. ").
57
58

State v. Murphy, 17 A. 998, 999 (R.I. 1889).
1 Horace Smith, ROSCOE'S DIGEST OF THE

LAW OF EVIDENCE IN

CRIMINAL CASES 28 (8th Am. ed. 1888); see also 3 WILLIAM OLDNALL
RUSSELL, TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 248-49 (9th ed. 1877).

[hereinafter Russell]
59 See Rex v. Clarke, 171 Eng. Rep. 633 (1817) (finding only fact of
complaint admissible); Regina v. Walker, 174 Eng. Rep. 266 (1839) (same);
Regina v. Osborne, 174 Eng. Rep. 622 (1842) (same); 3 Greenleaf, supra
note 54, at § 213 (corroboration permissible); 3 Russell, supra note 58 at
249 (same).
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be admitted." 60 Recall, for instance, the King's Bench's holding
in Brasier that an alleged victim's complaint made to her mother
upon coming home from an alleged assault was inadmissible
because the victim was "not sworn or produced as a witness on
the trial."61 Nearly a century later, an American court held that
an alleged victim's statements that her parents elicited soon after
an alleged assault with intent to commit rape were inadmissible
because the declarant did not testify and the statements were
"not [made] in the presence of the accused.", 62 It is hard to miss
the confrontation rhetoric in these decisions. Thus, even as
courts gradually discarded the supposition that victims of certain
violent acts typically would complain right after they happened,
they adhered to the restriction
against introducing absent
63
complaints.
fresh
victims'
C. The Modern Creation of the Excited Utterance Doctrine
During the same time that courts in criminal cases were
rigorously excluding absent declarant's statements that reported
past events-no matter how agitated or excited the declarant had

60 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272.1, at 223 (4th ed. 1992) (emphasis
added); 3 Russell, supra note 58, at 249 (same); 3 Greenleaf, supra note 54,
at § 213 ("The complaint constitutes no part of the res gestae... and where
she is not a witness in the case, it is wholly inadmissible."); Roscoe, supra
note 25, at 23 (same).
61 King v. Brasier, 1 Leach 199, 200 (K.B. 1779).
62 Weldon v. State, 32 Ind. 81, 82 (1869).
63 See Regina v. Guttridges, 173 Eng. Rep. 916 (1840) (finding fresh

complaint to friend inadmissible because witness was not available to testify);
Regina v. Megson, 173 Eng. Rep. 894 (1840) (describing where the
complaint made "as soon as [alleged victim] returned home" was
inadmissible "to [show] who committed the offence" because she did not
testify at trial); People v. McGee, 1 Denio 19, 22-24 (N.Y. 1845) (reversing
conviction because alleged victim's complaint to housekeeper "immediately
after the offense is supposed to have been perpetrated" was improperly
admitted in light of fact alleged victim did not testify at trial); Hornbeck v.
State, 35 Ohio St. 277, 280-81 (1879) (reversing conviction because alleged
victim's fresh complaint was introduced without her testifying at trial); Elmer
v. State, 20 Ariz. 170 (1919) (same).
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been--one must note for the sake of completeness that some
courts in civil cases occasionally extended the scope of the res
gestae doctrine to cover statements made, as the Supreme Court
put it in Insurance Co. v. Mosley, "almost contemporaneously
with [an injury's] occurrence." 64 Instead of seriously arguing
that such statements were-as the res gestae concept requirespart of the events themselves, the Supreme Court justified the
statements' admission primarily on the ground that "[i]n the
ordinary concerns of life, no one would doubt the truth" of
declarations made shortly after disruptive events. 65 A few late
nineteenth century state criminal cases invoked similar
reliability-based reasoning, albeit usually in decisions involving
statements that the courts also legitimately deemed to be part of
the underlying transactions.66
Writing the first edition of his influential treatise in 1904,
Wigmore recognized that decisions such as Mosley could not
67
really be explained by the common-law res gestae doctrine.
But instead of rejecting these cases as strays, Wigmore accepted
their results and advanced, for the first time, the notion that the
"stress of nervous excitement . . . stills the reflective facilities"
and renders statements under that condition "particularly
trustworthy," thereby warranting exemption from the hearsay
68
rule.
Evenpsychological
putting asideassumptions,
questions concerning
thetreatise
validitytook
of
69 Wigmore's
Wigmore's
64

75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 408 (1869) (emphasis added). Not all courts

did so, however. For state civil cases refusing into the twentieth century to
extend the res gestae concept in this manner, see Friedman & McCormack,
supra note 35, at notes 167-75 (citing various cases).
65 Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 408.
66 See, e.g., Territory v. Callaghan, 6 P. 49, 54 (Utah 1885) (noting that
"[n]o time had elapsed for the fabrication of a story."); Robinson, 27 So. at
130 (finding no opportunity for "fabrication").
67 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1745-47, at 2247-50 and § 1796, at 2320
(1904).
68 Id. § 1747, at 2250.
69 For a synthesis of the criticisms of these assumptions, see
Aviva
Orenstein, "My God! ": A Feminist Critique of the Excited Utterance
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 85 CAL. L. REV. 159, 178-82 (1997).
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two further steps that were simply wrong.
First, Wigmore claimed that statements reporting past events
while under the stress of excitement were comparable to the
statement that the court admitted in the noted 1694 case of
Thompson v. Trevanion,70 and thus that the idea of "excited
utterances" had some historical pedigree. Thompson was a civil
case in which the court upheld the admission of a woman's
declaration "immediat[ely] upon the hurt received, and before
[she] had time to devise or contrive anything to her own
advantage." 7 1 In contrast to Wigmore, most Founding-Era
commentators did not take the case's four-sentence nisi prius
report to mean that the declarant's statement was admitted in her
absence to prove that the defendant injured her. 72 But even if the
statement was used this way, the court's holding would have
been a fairly standard res gestae ruling. The reporter's phrase
"immediat[ely] upon the hurt received" 73 is most naturally read
to mean that the statement was made so simultaneously with
being injured that it was part of the event itself-the victim's
direct response to being assaulted. 74

70

Skin. 402, 90 Eng. Rep. 179 (K.B. 1694).

71 Id.
72

One treatise assumed that the declarant's statement simply described

her injury and was not accusatory. See 3 Russell, supra note 58, at 248 &
n.1. Another believed that the statement was admitted solely to show she
complained but not to prove how it happened. See 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A
PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, pt. II, § 30, at 149 (1826).
Still another assumed that the declarant testified at trial, so that her out-ofcourt statement was nothing more than corroborative evidence. See
GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 108 (1754). See generally
Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397, 418 (1869) (Clifford, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Thompson is "so imperfectly reported that [it] can
hardly be said to be reliable").
73 90 Eng. Rep. at 179.
74 Dictionaries during the Founding era support this interpretation. See A
(defining
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(1783)
UNIVERSAL
ETYMOLOGICAL
"immediate" as "[wihich follows without any thing coming between; that
follows or happens presently; that acts without means"); COMPLETE AND
UNIVERSAL ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1792) ("In such a state with respect to
something else, as to have nothing in between; without any thing intervening;
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Second, Wigmore did not distinguish between civil and
criminal cases in advancing the new reliability-based hearsay
exception for excited utterances. Wigmore openly acknowledged
that, in contrast to classic res gestae statements, narrative
statements describing actions that had just completed were
"testimonial," as he used that term. 75 But even when such
statements reported criminal acts to governmental agents,
Wigmore did not perceive this as posing Confrontation Clause
concerns in ensuing criminal prosecutions. He thought the
Clause did "not prescribe what kinds of testimonial
statements ... shall be given infrajudicially"; this depended, in
his view, exclusively "on the law of evidence for the time

not acting by second causes. Instant, or present, as applied to time."). I am
indebted to Rich Friedman for supplying this thought and this research.
Indeed, courts as late as the 1880's observed that reading Thompson to
support the admissibility of an absent witness's declaration describing a truly
completed act for the truth of the matter asserted would have been "difficult
to reconcile with established principles." Smith, supra note 58, at 28; see
also Mayes v. State, 1 So. 733, 734 (Miss. 1887) (refusing to interpret
Thompson this way); People v. Ah Lee, 60 Cal. 85, 89 (Cal. 1882) (same).
75 3 Wigmore, supra note 67 § 1746, at 2248-49; see also id. § 1796, at
2320 ("[W]hat [courts] do in this instance is to admit extrajudicial assertions
as testimony to the fact asserted.") (emphasis added). Wigmore explained:
Whenever, therefore, an [excited] utterance is used as
testimony that the fact asserted in it did occur as asserted,
i.e., on the credit of the speaker as a credible person, it is
being used testimonially, and is within the [general]
prohibition of the Hearsay rule.
Now this testimonial use is precisely the use that is made of
the present class of statements. . . . [Tihey clearly do
involve the testimonial use of the assertion to prove the
truth of the fact asserted,-for example, when the injured
person declares who assaulted him or whether the
locomotive bell was rung, or when the bystander at an
affray exclaims that the defendant shot first. Such statements
are genuine instances of using a hearsay assertion
testimonially; i.e., we believe that Doe shot the pistol, or
that the bell was rung, because the declarant so assertswhich is essentially the feature of all human testimony.
3 Wigmore, supra note 67, at §1746, at 2249 (first emphasis added).
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being. ,,76
Crawford, however, expressly rejected Wigmore's toothless
view of the Confrontation Clause 77 and held that the
Confrontation Clause does not depend on "the vagaries of the
rules of evidence, much less [on] amorphous notions of
'reliability."' 78 Therefore, while the perceived reliability of
certain out-of-court statements describing completed events
afforded a legitimate theoretical basis in cases beyond the reach
of the Sixth Amendment to allow the admission of such
statements, the excited utterance exception has nothing to teach
us about the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Only the res
gestae concept was developed in order to interlock with
constitutional restrictions respecting the introduction of out-ofcourt testimony against criminal defendants.
II. THE DAVIS OPINION

It is readily apparent that Davis fits within the common-law
res gestae tradition. The Court explicitly held that statements
describing to agents of law enforcement "what happened" are
testimonial, but that statements describing "what is happening"
are not.79 To be sure, I argued in the case that the Court should
define the "what is happening" category narrowly-limiting it,
as many courts did at common law, to statements describing the
alleged crime itself in progress. 80 But the Court, consistent with
the other courts' broader construction that the res gestae concept
encapsulates not only statements describing events in progress,
but also those made immediately after in direct consequence to
such events, 81 held that the 911 caller's statements describing
events as the assailant fled were not testimonial.
The Court also defended its ruling on two other grounds.

76

Id. § 1397, at 1755.

77 See Crawford v. Washington,
78 Id. at 61.
79
80
81

541 U.S. 36, 50-51, 67-68 (2004).

Id. at 2278.
See Brief for Petitioner at 12.
See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
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First, the Court emphasized that police statements elicited in
order to address an "ongoing emergency" are not testimonial,
but that when no such emergency exists and police elicit
statements are
investigatory purposes,
statements for
82
testimonial. Second, the Court explained that statements that
"do precisely what a witness does on direct examination" are
testimonial, while those that do not align with any courtroom
analogues are not. 83 But, as I shall now contend, neither of these
ideas, viewed in isolation, has force as an organizing principle
for confrontation jurisprudence. Only by understanding the
Davis opinion through the prism of the res gestae doctrine can
the opinion's otherwise loose strands be synthesized.
A.

"Ongoing Emergency"

Consider first the concept of an "ongoing emergency.",84
Other than offering the label, the Court tells us very little about
what constitutes an ongoing emergency. So perhaps the best
indicators can be found in the actual results of Davis and
Hammon v. Indiana, its companion case.
The Court in Davis held that an ongoing emergency existed
while the 911 caller described her alleged assailant in action.
But the Court also indicated in rather explicitly worded dicta
that as soon as "Davis drove away from the premises" and the
operator asked the caller to describe how the alleged assault had
begun and progressed, the caller's statements were testimonial.85
(By viewing Appendix A, a transcript of the entire 911 call, the
reader can see exactly where the Court suggests the caller's
statements became testimonial.)
What changed in this flash of an instant? Certainly not the
fact that the caller was in danger or that a suspected felon was
on the loose. Rather, the Court tells us that the caller switched
from describing events "as they were actually happening" to

83

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74, 2276-78.
Id. at 2277-78 (emphasis added).

84

Id. at 2273-74.

85

Id. at 2277.

82
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describing "what happened in the past. "86 In other words, the
statements elicited at the beginning of the call "describe[d]
current circumstances," while those at the end "describe[d] past
events. "87
The Court also held in Hammon that no ongoing emergency
existed where the police questioned a suspected recent victim of
domestic violence while other officers detained her husband in
the next room. Although Justice Thomas noted in his dissent that
the violence that the officers suspected had just occurred might
88
have resumed if the officers had left without doing anything,
the eight-Justice majority "easi[ly]" concluded that no ongoing
emergency existed while the officers questioned the suspected
victim because there was no "immediate threat" or disturbance
89
in progress.
This strong res gestae orientation requires us to take a closer
look at the curious phrase "ongoing emergency." The phrase
brings to mind a scene in the movie A Few Good Men. Jack
Nicholson, the colonel at a military base where a marine had
been killed, testifies at the resulting court marshal that he
believed before the killing that the marine had been in danger.
Tom Cruise, the lawyer cross-examining him, asks whether
Nicholson means that the marine had been in "grave danger."
Nicholson replies, "Is there any other kind?" One might ask the
same question about an "ongoing emergency." Doesn't the
presence of an emergency, by definition, connote something that
is ongoing?
I think not-at least as the Court is using the term. Rather
than being a needless redundancy once the word "emergency" is
in play, the word "ongoing" is really the dominant word here.
The difference between the statements at the beginning of the
call in Davis and the statements at the end of the call (as well as
those in Hammon) is not whether some kind of "emergency"
existed (if we define that concept, as the dictionary does, as a
86

Id. at 2276.

87 Id.
88
89

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2285-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2278.
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set of circumstances that "calls for immediate action" or "a
pressing need" for assistance). 90 The difference is whether the
events the caller was describing were "ongoing" or not.
Accordingly, the word "emergency" is really just a more
specific version of the word "events"-a natural focal point in
the context of a 911 call since the general purpose of calling 911
is to report emergencies.
Some courts in the wake of Davis have already attained this
insight. In State v. Kirby,9 1 for example, a man allegedly
assaulted a woman, forced her into her car, and drove off. The
woman managed to escape when the man pulled over to check a
noise in the car, and she drove back home. She then reported
and described the kidnapping on the phone to the police and told
them she needed medical assistance. After the trial court allowed
into evidence the entire 911 call, as well as an interview minutes
later with responding officers, the State argued on appeal that
the statements were nontestimonial because "an ongoing public
safety emergency and a possible
medical emergency" existed
92
made.
were
statements
while the
The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected this argument. The
court reasoned that such an elastic definition of ongoing
emergency "would render virtually any telephone report of a
past violent crime in which the suspect was at large, no matter
the timing of the call," a report of an ongoing emergency and
thus nontestimonial.93 Here, the victim's statements "consisted
of her account of what had happened to her in the recent past,
rather than what was happening at the time of the call" and the
ensuing on-the-scene interview. 94 As such, they had to be
considered testimonial.
Other courts have resolved similar cases
95
reasoning.
with like
90 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH

LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 741 (1993).
91 908 A.2d 506, 523 (Conn. 2006).
92

Id. at n. 19.

93 id.

Id. at 523; see also id. at 524 (showing an analysis of a on-the-scene
interview).
95 See, e.g., State v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 (W. Va. 2006)
94
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But many courts have resolved cases falling in between the
facts of Davis and Hammon by applying expansive notions of the
emergency concept, untethered to the res gestae doctrine. Some
courts, notwithstanding Davis' strong suggestion to the
contrary, 96 have held that a person's statements describing past
events to law enforcement are nontestimonial whenever a
potentially violent assailant has fled the scene of the crime and is
still on the loose. 9 7 These holdings include decisions-directly
contrary to the common law res gestae doctrine-that victims'98
statements identifying who recently shot them are admissible.
Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has explicitly held that
the temporal nature of a responding officer's questioning-there,
asking "What happened?"-is irrelevant to whether a victim's
response is testimonial. 99 So long, the court reasoned, as a
responding officer is motivated more by a desire to assure public
safety than to investigate a crime, anything a person says to him
(holding that a domestic violence victim's statements to responding officers
were not testimonial because there "was no emergency in progress when the
officers arrived); State v. Parks, 142 P.3d 720, 721 (Ariz. App. 2006)
(finding witness's statement to responding officer was testimonial in part
because the officer "was not seeking to determine 'what is happening' but
rather 'what happened."'); State v. Cannon, 2006 WL 3787915 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Dec. 27, 2006) (holding that statements to responding officers were
testimonial because the officers "spoke with the victim in order to learn about
past conduct and not in order to address an instantaneous emergency");
Santacruz v. State, 2006 WL 2506382 (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2006)
(concluding that statements in 911 call describing assault 10-15 minutes after
events ended were testimonial).
96 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
97 State v. Ayer, 2006 WL 3511787 (N.H. Dec. 7, 2007) (holding that
witness's statements to officers responding to a shooting were nontestimonial
because the assailant "was loose"); State v. Camarena, 145 P.2d 267, 275
(Or. App. 2006) (finding victim's statements to officers were not testimonial,
even though assailant had left, because he could have returned); State v.
Washington, 2006 WL 3719447, at *4 (Minn. App. Dec. 19, 2006)
(concluding that victim's statements to responding officer were nontestimonial
because "the assailant was still at large and posed an ongoing threat").
98 See United States v. Clemmons, 461 F.3d 1057 (8th Cir. 2006); Head
v. State, 2006 WL 3489041 (Md. App. Dec. 5, 2006).
99 People v. Bradley, 8 N.Y.3d 124 (N.Y. 2006).

HeinOnline -- 15 J.L. & Pol'y 612 2007

THE CONFRONTA TON CLA USE

613

is nontestimonial. 100
The problem with such decisions is that it is hard to
understand how a state of emergency, standing alone, is enough
to make a person's description of criminal activity to a law
enforcement agent nontestimonial. These courts are surely right
that immediate law enforcement action is necessary whenever
someone is in danger of incurring domestic violence or a
potentially violent person is on the loose. In the parlance of
Fourth Amendment law, such situations constitute "exigent
circumstances. "10 1
But the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to regulate
police officers, and the purpose of the exigent circumstances
doctrine is to allow police officers to take actions (such as
conducting warrantless searches) that they would not otherwise
be allowed to take. Neither of these concerns has anything to do
with the Confrontation Clause. The Confrontation Clause
regulates trial procedures, and the purpose of the Clause is to
'0o

It is worth reproducing in full the critical passage of the court's

opinion:
Defendant emphasizes that Mayfield's question to Dixon was in
the past tense: He said "what happened?" not "what's
happening?" From this, and from the fact that no attacker was in
sight at the moment, defendant would have us infer, in the
words of Davis, that "there [was] no ... ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to
establish or prove past events.... " We do not find the
inference a likely one. The officer's purpose in questioning
Dixon is shown more persuasively by the facts that came to his
attention-a 911 call, a distressed and injured woman-and by
the action he took after Dixon answered his question-entering
the apartment, without lingering to find out more detail-than by
his choice of tense. Any responsible officer in Mayfield's
situation would seek to assure Dixon's safety first, and
investigate the crime second. Because Dixon's statement was
made when the officer could reasonably have assumed, and
apparently did assume, that he had an emergency to deal with,
her statement was not testimonial under Crawford and Davis.
Id, at 127-28.
101 See Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1525 (2006); Brigham
City v. Staurt, 126 S. Ct. 1943, 1946-47 (2006).
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ensure that prosecution witnesses testify in court. While the
Fourth Amendment operates by means of an exclusionary rule in
order to deter police misconduct, the Confrontation Clause
operates by means of an exclusionary rule in order to safeguard
the trial process.
This explains why the Supreme Court acknowledged in
Davis that "it is in the final analysis the declarants'
statements ...

that the Confrontation Clause requires us to

0 2

evaluate."
The presence of an "ongoing emergency" is not
important because it reveals police motives or allows officers to
do something they otherwise would not have the power to do.
Instead, the presence of an ongoing emergency is important only
insofar as it indicates that a declarant's statement describing
criminal activity can fairly be described as part of the event
itself, rather than a report or a narrative of it. If the law were
otherwise, statements reporting serious criminal activity or
accusing others of violent crimes would always be
nontestimonial until a suspect was in custody and unable to
cause further harm. Even more to the point, if the law were
otherwise, Hammon would have had to come out the other way
and the Court could never have indicated that the latter part of
the 911 call in Davis was nontestimonial. Yet the emergencies in
those cases were limited to the criminal events themselves, and
when those events ceased occurring, statements describing how
they had transpired were testimonial.
B. What a Witness Does
The common law res gestae doctrine similarly informs
Davis' explanation that statements describing fresh criminal
activity are testimonial when they mimic "what a witness does
on direct examination"°103-that is, when "the evidentiary
products of the ex parte communication align perfectly with their
courtroom analogues. "4 In particular, the Court reasoned that
102

Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct 2266, 2274 n.1 (2006).

103 Id.
104

at 2278.
Id. at 2277.
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Amy Hammon's statements to the responding officers were
testimonial because they were "an obvious substitute for live
testimony."10 5 By contrast, the Court explained that the
statements at the beginning of the 911 call in Davis were not
testimonial because "[n]o 'witness'
goes into court to proclaim
6
an emergency and seek help."'

Lower courts and commentators have been virtually silent
concerning this strain of the Davis opinion, perhaps because they
do not know what to make of it. One might say that what a
witness does is give testimony under a highly formal and
ritualized set of circumstances, and that absent such trappings a
person is not providing a substitute for live testimony. On the
other hand, one might say that what a witness does is relay his
experiences and observations to another person, and that
whenever a person does that in a manner later useful to a
prosecution, the words are testimonial. The problem with each
of these hypotheses, of course, is that the Court already 10has
held
7
that neither accurately captures the testimonial principle.
The key, once again, to unlocking the Court's ambiguous
guidance lies in its res gestae rhetoric. Right after the Court
noted the resemblance between Amy Hammon's statements and
classic testimonial statements, the Court explained that her
statements "deliberately recounted, in response to police
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and
progressed."1 8 Now that is what a witness does. A witness tells
a person of authority what happened.
That is what the 911 caller in Davis did in the second half of
the call as well. While the caller used the present tense in the
beginning of the call to describe events in progress, she used the
past tense in the second part of the call to describe why and how
Davis had assaulted her. We rarely term someone who is
" Id. at 2278.
106 Id. at 2277.
107

Compare Id. at 2275 (describing how testimonial statements are not

limited to those "of the most formal sort") with Crawford, 124 S. Ct. at 1364
(noting that "a person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance" is not
a "witness").
'0'Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2278.
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describing ongoing events as a witness; such a person, even if
speaking at some remove from the events, is more like a playby-play announcer. But we commonly call someone who tells a
person at arms length what happened-even if it just finished
happening and the declarant is still on the scene-a witness.
Lest there be any doubt, think again, as the Court suggests,
about what occurs during direct examination at a trial. Perhaps
the most commonly asked question during direct examination in
a criminal case is "what happened?" Indeed, the second most
commonly asked question may be "what happened next?" In
purely functional terms, anyone who answers these kinds of
questions is acting like a witness-at least when the person
asking the questions is a person of authority who is acting in
that capacity.
III. BEYOND FRESH ACCUSATIONS TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Conceptualizing the confrontation right as interlocking with
the res gestae doctrine not only brings clarity to the right in the
realm of fresh accusations to agents of law enforcement, but it
also sharpens our understanding of the right in other areas.
Three types of statements, in particular, that have generated
substantial litigation appear more clearly testimonial when
analyzed through a res gestae lens: (1) statements to employees
of private victims' services organizations; (2) statements to
medical personnel; and (3) children's statements to their parents.
Each of these categories of statements, of course, is worthy in
its own right of a separate article. But it seems worthwhile to
briefly sketch the implications of Davis' res gestae approach for
each.
A. Statements to Employees of Private Victims' Services
Organizations
Recent years have seen a proliferation of privately operated
victims' services organizations-organizations such as sexual
assault resource centers and child abuse assessment centers. All
of these organizations work to some degree with law
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enforcement, but none, by definition, is an actual arm of the
government. The organizations are designed to offer comfort
and support to crime victims and to help them navigate the legal
process. An integral component of delivering those services, of
course, is conducting detailed interviews and discussions with
victims concerning what happened to them.
The majority of courts since Crawford was decided have
held that victims' statements to private victims' services
personnel are testimonial, especially when such personnel
interview victims in coordination with law enforcement.109 Some
courts, however, have taken a different approach, holding that
statements in these settings are not testimonial because they are
made to nongovernmental personnel who are motivated more 110
by
therapeutic purposes than investigative or prosecutorial intent.
These assumptions that traditional law enforcement goals do not
motivate private victims' services organizations are certainly
debatable. But it is hard to say that they are clearly wrong.
Private victims' services organizations try to accomplish a
host of interrelated goals, and discerning which goal primarily
motivates any single organization at any single moment is no
easy task. If a court really wants to uphold the admissibility of a
statement to such an organization, there is very little in an
abstract "primary purpose" inquiry that squarely forecloses that
result.
One might argue in response to these concerns, as Rich
Friedman does, that if we put purposes aside and ask whether a
109 See

State v.

Blue,

717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006)

(reporting

statements to private forensic interviewer working "in concert with or as an
agent of' the police); People v. Sharp, __ P.3d __, 2006 WL 3635393
(Colo. App. Dec. 14, 2006); State v. Pitt, 147 P.3d 930 (Or. App. 2006);
People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753 (Cal. App. 2004) (describing child's
statement to child interview specialist at private victim assessment center); In
re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d 183 (I11. App. 2004) (detailing child's statements
to private child abuse investigator).
110 See State v. Cannon, __ S.W.3d __, 2006 WL 3787915 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Dec. 27, 2006) (describing rape victim's statement to sexual
assault center employee working in conjunction with police not testimonial);
People v. Geno, 261 Mich. App. 624 (2004) (noting that a child's statement
to director of Children's Assessment Center was not testimonial).
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reasonable declarant would have "anticipated" that her
statements would be available for prosecutorial use, then the
answer is clearly "yes" and the declarant's statements are thus
clearly testimonial."' But even assuming that Davis permits
courts to base their decisions on declarants' reasonable
anticipations,
this expectation-based inquiry still seems
inadequate to deal with these kinds of statements. Whenever
courts are given license to surmise-based usually on little or no
direct evidence-what was (or reasonably would have been) in
an actor's mind, courts are bound to reach inconsistent results.
Any court intent in reaching a particular result can simply
pronounce what a certain actor would have anticipated, and
there is no firm proof that an aggrieved party can bring forward
to challenge that result.
More importantly, the reasonable anticipation test-at least
standing alone-appears to lead to unacceptable results. Imagine
that the police set up, or invite an existing enterprise to operate
as, what I will call an "undercover" victims' services
organization. The organization advertises itself as strictly a
counseling establishment, and tells victims that nothing they say
there will be transmitted to law enforcement or is allowed to be
introduced in a court of law. Under such circumstances, one
would be hard pressed to say that a reasonable declarant talking
to such an organization would anticipate that their statements
could be used as a substitute for their live testimony in court.
Yet it seems palpably incorrect to say that their statements
would not be testimonial.
The res gestae analysis in Davis makes these tricky cases
easy. Whatever may be in the declarants' or questioners' minds
when they participate in interviews at private victims' services
centers, it is undeniable that the declarants are doing exactly
what a witness does. They are recounting past events to a person
of authority. The statements are entirely removed from the
events themselves. And, in the words of Davis, "the evidentiary
products" of these interviews "align[] perfectly with their

.. Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial,"

71 BROOK. L. REv. 241, 251-53 (2005).
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courtroom analogues." 1 2 It thus is plain that the declarant's
statements are testimonial.
B. Statements to Medical Personnel
Statements that people make to doctors and nurses who are
at least in part treating their injuries present similar issues.
Medical services personnel are typically private employees but
they also often work in conjunction with law enforcement.
Sometimes police officers accompany or direct suspected victims
of crime to the hospital and explicitly ask doctors or nurses to
collect evidence. Even when police officers are not so directly
involved at the time medical examinations take place, many
doctors and nurses operate as specialists designed to look for
signs of certain crimes, such as sexual assaults or child abuse.
Nearly all doctors and nurses perform their duties under state
laws that
require them to report cases of suspected abuse to the
13
1
police.
As in the context of private victims' services organizations,
courts are divided over whether statements describing criminal
activity to medical personnel are testimonial. Most, but not all
courts have held that when the police are directly involved in
presenting the injured party for 114the examination, the injured
party's statements are testimonial.
But absent such explicit involvement, the vast majority of
112

113

Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.

67, 81 (2001)

(referencing and approving of such laws).
114 See People v. Harless, 125 Cal. App. 4th 70 (2004), rev. granted,
109 P.3d 69 (Cal.), rev. dismissed, 119 P.3d 962 (Cal. 2005) (finding
statement to doctor "in the course of the district attorney's investigation of
child abuse" testimonial); State v. Krasky, 721 N.W.2d 916 (Minn. App.
2006) (same). But see State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834 (Ohio 2006) (holding
in a 4-3 opinion that rape victim's statement to nurse collecting rape kit in
coordination with police not testimonial); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 849
N.E.2d 218 (Mass. 2006) (finding child's statements to doctor examining for
signs of abuse after the police were involved were not testimonial, but state
law excluded identification of perpetrator so court did not address whether
those statements would have been testimonial).
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courts have held that statements to doctors or nurses-even when
they are expressly asking questions to determine whether a
patient has been criminally harmed-are nontestimonial." 5 These
courts reason that medical personnel are primarily interested in
attending to the health and safety of the people they examine,
and that people telling treating physicians and nurses how they
were injured would not expect those statements to be used in a
criminal prosecution.
Consider the Minnesota Court of Appeals' decision in In the
Matter of A.J.A. 116 Parents of a five-year-old suspected that he
had been abused and called the police. The detective who came
to the house, after consulting with the local prosecutor's office,
suggested to the parents that they take their son to a local
15 See People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo. 2006) (showing a child's
statements to physician examining for signs of abuse not testimonial); State v.
Scacchetti, 711 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. 2006) (showing the same in nurse's
examination at hospital unit designed to examine for signs of abuse); State v.
Brigman, 632 S.E.2d 498 (N.C. App. 2006) (noting that a child's statements
to doctor examining for signs of abuse not testimonial); Griner v. State, 899
A.2d 189 (Md. App. 2006) (demonstrating that a child's statements to nurse
after police involved not testimonial); Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847
(Miss. 2006) (showing that a statement to pediatrician was nontestimonial,
although had police been involved when examination took place, "then it
might be possible for the statements to implicate the Confrontation Clause);
United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that a child's
statements to a doctor wholly unconnected to law enforcement were not
testimonial); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W. 2d 284 (Neb. 2004) (holding that
statement to doctor identifying perpetrator was not testimonial because "there
was [no] indication of government involvement in the initiation or course of
the examination"); State v. Moses, 119 P.3d 906 (Wash. App. 2005) (same);
Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677 (Miss. 2005) (same); People v. Cage, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 846 (Cal. App. 2004) (same), rev. granted (Cal. 2004); State v.
Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. App. 2005); State v. Lee, 2005 WL 544837
(Ohio. App. March 9, 2005) (same), appeal allowed, 836 N.E.2d 1227 (Ohio
2005). But see Medina v. State, 143 P.3d 471 (Nev. 2006) (holding that
statements to medical personnel examining for signs of abuse are testimonial
because such personnel are required to report suspicions to law enforcement);
In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. 2004) (noting that statements
"identifying respondent as perpetrator" were testimonial, but statements
describing physical condition were not).
116 2006 WL 2474267 (Minn. App. Aug. 29, 2006).
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medical clinic that performed child abuse evaluations. The
parents did so.
At the clinic, medical personnel conducted a detailed
physical and oral evaluation, at which the child told a nurse that
the defendant touched him inappropriately. Although there were
no physical signs of abuse, the nurse reported the child's
allegations to the police pursuant to the state's mandatory
reporting requirement. After the trial court held that these
statements could not be admitted in the absence of the alleged
victim testifying at trial, the appellate court reversed on the
grounds that the interviewer's primary purpose was to ensure the
child's health, safety, and well-being, and the child would not
statements would have been available for
have anticipated his
17
trial.1
a
at
use
later
For anyone who cares about protecting the confrontation
right, this result should be deeply troubling. By referring a
suspected victim of abuse to a medical facility, the police and
local prosecutor were able to generate a detailed statement that
they could use to prosecute the alleged abuser without ever
giving the defendant a chance to question his accuser. Law
enforcement, in effect, designed a system (an easily replicable
one, at that) in which someone accusing another of crime never
needed to testify in court.
Even taking away this direct governmental involvement,
allowing the state to introduce the child's statement to the nurse
without putting the child on the stand poses profound Sixth
Amendment problems. Especially when considered against the
backdrop of mandatory reporting laws, allowing such a
procedure threatens to turn doctors and nurses into surrogate
witnesses in child abuse and possibly other types of cases. The
role of medical personnel would not be altogether different from
interrogating magistrates' under the Marian statutes, whose job
it was to conduct ex parte investigatory interviews with
witnesses in felony cases and to certify the results to the court,
so the court could decide how to proceed and whether to detain

117

id.
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18
the suspects pending trial. 1
But neither a "primary purpose" test nor a "reasonable
anticipation" standard clearly illuminates why these kinds of
statements to medical personnel should be considered
testimonial. It is obviously true that doctors and nurses are
interested in safeguarding health and well-being, and it is
foolhardy if not impossible to assess how exactly that interest
interlocks with effective law enforcement or when one thing
predominates over the other. It also is at least debatable when
reasonable people receiving a medical evaluation would
anticipate that their descriptions to treating doctors and nurses
would expect that the descriptions would be available for use in
an ensuing criminal investigation or trial.
Once again, Davis' res gestae analysis brings the picture into
clearer focus. When a person submits to a detailed and
structured interview with someone who is trying, at least in part,
to discern whether they have been criminally harmed, that
should be all we need to know. The declarant is not under any
immediate threat and is narrating purely past events.
Furthermore, the evidentiary product that results is functionally
equivalent to testimony on direct examination. Even if certain
snippets of medical interviews-such as descriptions of physical
symptoms-are nontestimonial, descriptions, as Davis puts it, of19
1
"how potentially criminal past events began and progressed"
and especially who perpetrated them, must be considered
testimonial.

C. Children's Statements to Parents
120
Under the reliability-based framework of Ohio v. Roberts,
most states enacted special hearsay exceptions to deal with
childrens' allegations of abuse. Generally speaking, these
exceptions provided that any allegation of abuse was admissible
in a criminal case, so long as the trial court deemed the

118

See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43-44, 53 (discussing the Marian statutes).
v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2278 (2006).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).

119 Davis
120
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allegation sufficiently "trustworthy."0 21 Moreover, such out-ofcourt allegations could be-and routinely were-introduced even
when courts later deemed the child-declarants incompetent to
testify at trial because
they did not know the difference between
22
1
lie.
a
and
truth
a
In the wake of Crawford, every court to address the issue
has held that allegations of abuse made to police officers or
other governmental personnel associated with law enforcement
(personnel often specially trained to interview children) are
testimonial. 123 At the same time, courts uniformly have held that
a child's statements to family members (usually parents, but
sometimes other relatives) describing abuse are nontestimonial,
at least when made before the police are involved.1 24 Courts
121 See
122

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.120.
For one example of such a case, see State v. C.J., 63 P.3d 765

(Wash. 2003), in which the court held that a child's allegations of abuse to
his mother and a police officer were admissible even though the child was
incompetent to testify and was "unable to characterize the difference between
truthful and false statements." Id. at 767.
123 See, e.g., Flores v. State, 120 P.3d 1170 (Nev. 2005) (utilizing
statements made to a police officer); People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916 (Colo.
2006) (utilizing statements made to a police officer); Hobgood v. State, 926
So. 2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (same); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548
(8th Cir. 2005) (utilizing statements to "forensic interviewer" testimonial);
People v. Warner, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419 (Cal. App. 2004) (working with
statements made to a child interview specialist); L.J.K. v. State, 942 So. 2d
854 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (same).
124 See, e.g., Hobgood v. State, 926 So.2d 847 (Miss. 2006) (noting that
statements to police were testimonial but not statements to relatives before
police were involved); In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E.2d at 186 (holding that
statement to mother were not testimonial where "[t]here is no indication that
[mother] suspected he had been the victim of a crime and that she was
attempting to elicit evidence for a future prosecution"); People v. R.F., 2005
WL 323718 (Ill. App. Feb. 10, 2005) (concluding in a divided decision that
child's accusation to mother and grandmother was not testimonial); State v.
Walker, 118 P.3d 935 (Wash. App. 2005) (holding that statement to child's
mother was not testimonial); State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006)
(showing same regarding statements to mother and family friend). Appellate
courts have not yet grappled with situations in which family members have
elicited statements from children after the police are involved for use in a
criminal prosecution, but it is not hard to imagine such a scenario and why it
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have distinguished between statements made to governmental
personnel and those made to family members on the grounds
that only the former are associated with law enforcement and
people would not expect that statements made to family
members would be used for investigatory or prosecutorial
purposes.
Even accepting those assumptions as correct, Davis provides
reason for questioning the accuracy of courts' holdings that
childrens' descriptions to parents of past abuse are always
nontestimonial. Childrens'
statements describing abuseespecially when the product of probing questioning by parentsfunction quite nicely as a "'weaker substitute for live testimony'
at trial." 25 Children are doing exactly with their parents what a
witness does with a lawyer in court: answering questions
designed to elicit whether they have been criminally harmed
and, if so, to describe how that that harm occurred. While
parents are not governmental actors, they are people of authority
in their children's eyes-the people to complain to when
something is wrong and needs to be fixed. 126
The Davis opinion, in fact, favorably discusses a Foundingera English case that supports this analysis. In King v.
Brasier,127 a child, "immediately upon her coming home," told
her mother that she had been sexually assaulted and described
"all the circumstances of the injury which had been done to
her.' 128 The next day, she identified a neighbor as her attacker.
The King's Bench held that the child's statements were

would raise serious questions. Cf State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21 (N.C.
App. 2005) (holding that foster mother's taped interview with child was not
testimonial).
125 Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2277 (2006)
(quoting United
States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (2006)).
126 Indeed, the common law res gestae cases even excluded adults'
statements describing completed criminal events to other private parties, in
part because the statements bore such a close functional resemblance to
testimony on direct examination. See supra notes 37-63 and accompanying
text.
127 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).
128 Id. at 200.
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inadmissible in the absence of the child taking the stand at trial,
for "no testimony whatever"-apparently including out-of-court
testimonial statements"-can be legally received except upon
oath." 129 The Supreme Court in Davis accepted this holding,
indicating that the child's statement to her mother was
testimonial-as opposed to the 911 caller's description of
ongoing events-because "by the time the victim got home, her
story was an account of past events."' 30 That is, the statement
was not part of the res gestae.
Some appellate courts may think that classifying childrens'
accusations such as these as testimonial would lead to harsh or
even unacceptable results. Child abuse is a horrible crime, the
thinking goes, and many guilty people might not be prosecuted
if the government were unable to introduce their out-of-court
accusations as substantive evidence in trials. This is a highly
emotional and intellectually challenging problem. But let me put
two propositions on the table that somewhat mollify the impact
of Davis' suggestion that many childrens' descriptions of abuse
are testimonial.
First, precisely because child abuse is such a deplorable
crime, we should be vigilant about protecting a few basic
procedural rights, lest our passions get the best of us. Imagine
for a moment that the neighbor in Brasier was innocent and that
the child's uncle actually assaulted her, but the child was afraid
to tell her mother this because her uncle was her mother's
brother. I think we would all agree that if the statements were
admitted and accepted, the trial would have caused a grave
miscarriage of justice. By far the best chance for avoiding that
injustice would have been requiring confrontation. Prosecutors,
in short, will sometimes pursue charges based on untrue
accusations, and we need to have a way of ferreting those cases
out.
Second, it is important to recognize that the confrontation
problem in a large percentage of these cases appears to be one
of the government's own making. Children who tell their parents
129

130

Id.
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2277.
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they have been abused are unable to testify in court because
state laws, in the form of competency requirements, say they are
unable to testify. The Supreme Court has never decided whether
such competency requirements render children "unavailable" for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause. 131 But even if they do, I
am not aware of any constitutional reason why states need to
demand that children understand an oath or even that they
demonstrate that they know the difference between a truth and a
lie in order to testify in court. The Confrontation Clause may
well require an oath when possible, but as with the requirement
that witnesses testify at the trial itself, this requirement may not
be unyielding when at least cross-examination is possible.
Indeed, it strikes me as rather perverse for states so willingly to
accept the legitimacy of children's out-of-court narratives while
simultaneously deeming that anything they might say in courtwhere the defendant would actually have a chance to ask
questions too-would be useless. By relaxing competency
requirements, states could not only foster the introduction of
evidence at child abuse trials, but also provide defendants with a
way of challenging that evidence and the jury with a means for
assessing it.
CONCLUSION

The lesson of the failed Roberts framework is that the
confrontation right needs to be protected with doctrine that
reflects confrontation values. Courts should heed that lesson
when interpreting and applying the Davis decision. Assessing
simply whether an "emergency" existed while a person
described potentially criminal events does not meaningfully help
determine whether introducing the person's statement in a
criminal trial would make the person a "witness" against the

131

The Court expressly reserved this issue in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S.

805, 816 (1990). This issue has not only Sixth Amendment implications, but
Due Process implications as well, since a defendant has a constitutional right
to put witnesses on the stand who are necessary to presenting a defense. See
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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defendant. Nor does examining any questioner's primary
purpose in eliciting such an out-of-court statement materially
assist in that inquiry. Rather, the best way to determine whether
introducing a fresh accusation-or any other out-of-court
statement describing potentially criminal events-against a
criminal defendant triggers the Confrontation Clause is to ask
whether the person was narrating completed events to a person
of authority. That is what a "witness" does and what Davis
describes as producing testimonial evidence.
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Appendix A
132
Transcript of 911 Call in Davis

This is Liz Hennekay of the Valley Communications Center.
Today's date is February 6, 2001, and the time is 1340 hours.
The following taped incident has been recorded from the Valley
Communications master disk of February 1, 2001 at 1154 hours.
911 Operator:

911. Hello, 911.

[unknown]

[Hang up]... [unintelligible]

[new phone call; ringing]
911 Operator:

Hello.

Complainant:

Hello.

911 Operator:

What's going on?

Complainant:

He's here jumpin' on me again.

911 Operator:

Okay. Listen to me carefully. Are you in a
house or an apartment?

Complainant:

I'm in a house.

911 Operator:

Are there any weapons?

Complainant:

No. He's usin' his fists.

911 Operator:

Okay. Has he been drinking?

Complainant:

No.

911 Operator:

Okay, sweetie. I've got help started.
Stay on the line with me, okay?

Complainant:

I'm on the line.

911 Operator:

Listen to me carefully. Do you know his

132

This appears at pages 8-13 of the Joint Appendix in Davis.
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last name?
Complainant:

It's Davis.

911 Operator:

Davis? Okay, what's his first name?

Complainant:

Adran

911 Operator:

What is it?

Complainant:

Adrian.

911 Operator:

Adrian?

Complainant:

Yeah.

911 Operator:

Okay. What's his middle initial?

Complainant:

Martell. He's runnin' now.

[unintelligible]
911 Operator:

Listen, listen. What direction is running?

Complainant:

He's in a car.

911 Operator:

What car?

Complainant:

I don't know.

911 Operator:

What color?

Complainant:

It's blue or gray or somethin'.

911 Operator:

What direction?

Complainant:

He's riding up the street.

911 Operator:

Okay. What direction?

Complainant:

Goin' down, this is a dead-end street.
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911 Operator:

It's a dead-end street, so he's going out the
dead end?

Complainant:

Yeah.

911 Operator:

Is he alone?

Complainant:

No.

911 Operator:

How many people in the car with him?

Complainant:

I don't know. He just ran out the door
after he hit me.

911 Operator:

Okay. Do you need an aid car?

Complainant:

No, I'm all right.

911 Operator:

Okay sweetie.

[redaction]
911 Operator:

Stop talking and answer my questions.

Complainant:

All right.

911 Operator:

Okay. Do you know his birth date?

Complainant:

8/13/65.

911 Operator:

Okay, I'm having trouble understanding
you.

Complainant:

8/13/65. I've gotta close my door. My...

[child's voice in background] [unintelligible]
Child:

Hi Daddy.

911 Operator:

Hi. Can I talk your mommy?

Child:

Yeah.
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911 Operator:

Okay. Go get mommy. Thank you,
sweetie.

Child:

[unintelligible]

911 Operator:

Okay. Go get mommy.

631

[child's voice in background] [unintelligible]
2nd Child:

Hello.

911 Operator:

Hi. Where's the grownup in the house.

2nd Child:

[unintelligible] my mommy.

911 Operator:

Where's your mommy. Is she inside or
outside the house?

2nd Child:

Uh, walking(?).

911 Operator:

She's where.

Complainant:

Hello.

911 Operator:

Hi. We're gonna check the area first,
okay? And then they're gonna come talk to
you. Is this your ex-husband or a
boyfriend?

Complainant:

Yes.

911 Operator:

Well, which one-ex-husband?

Complainant:

Boyfriend.

911 Operator:

Okay, sweetie. Did he force his way into
the house-or...

Complainant:

No. I'm movin' today. He said he was
comin' to get his stuff. Somebody else
came over here, so he tried arguing with
me about that. So then I told him, "Look,
I gotta go. You gotta go."

911 Operator:

Um-hmm.
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Complainant:

So then he jumped up and started beating
me up in front of him. I don't know what
he was trying to prove.

911 Operator:

Okay,

[redaction]
I told him not to come.

Complainant:

*

911 Operator:

Okay.

Complainant:

I told him over and over.

911 Operator:

Okay. Okay. Take a deep breath. I need to
find out restraining order, so I need your
last name. What is it?

Complainant:

M-c-C-o-t-t-r-y.

911 Operator:

M-c-C-o-r-t...

Complainant:

M-c-C-o-t-t-r-y.

911 Operator:

Okay. And your first name?

Complainant:

Michelle.

911 Operator:

Michelle. And your middle initial?

Complainant:

I don't have one.

911 Operator:

Okay. What's your birth date.

Complainant:

5/10/69.

911 Operator:

Okay. Is your door locked?

Complainant:

Yes.

911 Operator:

Okay.

. .

[redaction]
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911 Operator:

S..

put that in the call. They're gonna

check the area for him first, and then
they're gonna come talk to you. Okay.
Complainant:

All right.

911 Operator:

Okay. Bye-bye.
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